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

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YULIA GUKOVA

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OF WORLD AFFAIRS

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From our mailbag

■ Not long ago the newspaper *Gorizont* (published in Kazakhstan) featured in intrview with the People's Deputy of the USSR Colonel Nikolai Petrushenko. When asked about his attitude to the events in the Persian Gulf, he said that he was in sympathy with Saddam Hussein. He stated, "We assess the events in the Persian Gulf from the viewpoint of universal human values." I wonder, whom does he mean by "we"? Does the entire world get out of step with universal human values and only our colonel keeps pace with them? But maybe, after all, he keeps in step with Saddam Hussein? Petrushenko said that had those events taken place five years ago, we (again – "we") would have called them the national liberation struggle of Iraq. Does he mean to say that five years ago we would have called Kuwait an agressor? Well, during Stalin's times that was exactly the case. We won't be surprised by anything now.

I think it is not by chance that in the colonel's statements one keeps coming across the word "we". I don't think that he means people's deputies. No, the colonel speaks on behalf of the military-industrial complex, and it is of it, his dear one, and not of universal human values that the colonel is concerned. It is already for quite some time that our army officers have come to believe in their omnipotence. They want to fight. So let them fight, but not the soldiers – our brothers and children. They have another mission – raising the country from ruins. No one is going to attack this country, provided we ourselves don't get involved in some conflict as it happened in the past.

N.Lebedev
war and labour veteran
the Moscow Region

■ The food situation and the threat of famine in the country have laid bare deep-seated diseases of society. People have come to the point when one could hear voices: "The only thing that matters is to have something to eat, all the rest is a trifling matter. We don't give a damn who will rule us." But I think that this is not the voice of the people, but the howl of a crowd. In difficult times, people must close their ranks to hold out. The first US president George Washington said, that those who were willing to give up even a small part of their freedom for the sake of their security deserved neither. But the crowd cannot react reasonably to what is going on and, when it is panic-stricken, it always yields to any demagogy. Our ideologists have never been interested in our people being cultured. A man of culture will never forgo his dignity and freedom in order to have a piece of bread. It will always matter for him who is at the helm. And such an indifference serves very much the purposes of our ideologists. When deprived of its material boons, a crowd becomes governable and pliant.

Today, when we are witnessing economic dislocation, ideologists from the CPSU claim that only the CPSU represents a real force.

On May 24, 1982 the CPSU

A message from St.Petersburg

■ The main thesis of the conception of the "Civic Way" is that "totalitarianism not only suppresses personality, but also destroys it, – believes the Democratic Union, – the system has captured the last fortress – the soul of man by destroying it from within." I am a member of the Democratic Union and I can go along almost entirely with that party's policy but the said conception.

What are the real facts? During the war communism, the workers, having yielded to the Pharisaical assertions of communists who blamed peasants for the creation of famine in the country, organized food appropriation detachments and went to the countryside to rob peasants. And what is going on today? Vorkuta miners did not blame their misfortunes on either cooperators, or national minorities, but directed their efforts at the struggle to change the existing system. Isn't this example indicative of the questionable character of the Democratic Union's assertions about "the destruction of the potential opposition to the system?"

Communists believed that man must (and will!) work without material incentives. Nikolai Berdyaev wrote: "...Marx believed that the new man is manufactured at factories," and Lenin completely believed in the public drill of man... Yet neither the drill, nor the upbringing of young people according to the system of Makarenko have made it possible to "form" the need to work. But the idea about the possibility of molding a man to order with the help of social influence has taken a deep root in our minds. Not surprisingly, such a conception has found its advocates among members of the Democratic Union.

The Democratic Union believes that the enemies of democracy are a certain system and its institutions. The Union urges people not to cooperate with any of the existing institutions and create their own ones. But such an approach is erroneous: bodies of power per se cannot be either criminal or inhuman. Soviet totalitarianism is based on the total domination of the apparat, and a radical change of the system means first of all taking away that power from the nomenklatura. And Soviets where democrats are in the majority already today put pressure on the nomenklatura's power. The Democratic Union claims that the Soviets only contribute to the "improvement of the institutions of totalitarian power," and call upon people not to cooperate with them. The realization of the "Civic Way" conception turns the Democratic Union into a radical sect. I think that we have to strive for the consolidation of democratic forces on the platform of the convocation of a constituent assembly, because the Soviets lack power to bring about a change in the social order.

Max Zilbert, member
of the Democratic Union
St.Petersburg, USSR

Colonel Petrushenko on the universal human values

The voice of the people and the howl of a crowd

Castes in Soviet society

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by Sergei Khasabov

adopted a document entitled "The USSR food programme for the period till 1990 and measures for its realization." The year 1990 has ended. All of us can see for ourselves how the CPSU has implemented its resolution. Nowadays they keep tight-lipped about this resolution as if it has never existed. Has it been annuled?

Asked what kind of specialists on agriculture work at the CPSU Central Committee, Academician Emelyanov said that he did not know what they were doing – they maintained no contacts with the Agricultural Academy. According to Anatoly Sobchak, at the CPSU Central Committee they think that a hardened party worker can be in charge of medicine, art and metallurgy. In a word, he can be in charge of anything. And we reap the fruits.

Igor Dorovskikh
Moscow, USSR

■ I read in issue No.41/90 an article titled "After attempt on Krushchev's life" in which the rector of Moscow State Institute of International Relations praises this institute for the elite. But as they say, we have already had enough of this, especially at some time ago I also tried to enter that blue-ribbon institute of higher education, but drew a blank. I don't feel sorry about it because, with my social background, I would have never been able to blend with the privileged student body of the Foreign Ministry's institute of higher education – I have never had either diplomats or high-ranking officials among my in-laws. As for perestroika and equal accessibility of that exclusive institute of higher education for all categories of entrants, such myths have been disseminated both by the present rector's precursors and other high placed officials, including the first graduates of Moscow State Institute of International Relations and now the well-known diplomats and journalists writing on international affairs whose children and also grandchildren, learn the ropes of international sciences in this institute. I could give you a list of dozens of such grandchildren.

It is not true that some serious changes have taken place there in the procedure of staffing the student body first of all because the institute continues to be under the wing of our Foreign Ministry, not the state bodies for public education as in the case with a majority of institutes of higher education, including universities. As long as this situation persists and the segregation is not eliminated it is simply ridiculous even to think about a change in the moral atmosphere at the institute. Preference will all the same be given to graduates of special schools, gymnasias and Lyceums as well as schools at Soviet Embassies abroad.

So, esteemed rectors, both present and future, when you talk about perestroika, glasnost and equity as applied to Moscow State Institute of International Relations show some respect for hundreds and thousands of entrants who have failed to become students only because of the "caste" discrimination that you keep on disclaiming and the roots of which have not yet been eliminated in the sixth year of perestroika. Don't add insult to injury!

Vyacheslav Malakhin,
lawyer, permanent reader of New Times

Moscow, USSR

A military doctrine and the law of the jungle

■ Despite the fact the contemporary world is striving for making its morals and manners more civilized, it continues to live according to the law of the jungle. In the process of natural selection the strongest survives – this is the law of the nature that cannot be ignored. Hence, objectively the Soviet Union needs a strong defence: in the pack of states no one wants to be a weakling at the service of those who are strong. So, the point is how to attain a sufficient level of defence capability?

Life shows that it is impossible to maintain the fighting ability of our armed forces under the existing economic system without a dictatorship. In conditions of the current economic crisis the resources allocated for the army have run short. It is an utter absurdity to defend the economic system under which the nuclear cudgel acquired for a fabulous price is brandished by a hungry and ragged bearded man. People are not against a strong army and a reliable defence. They don't want the might of the army to be created at the expense of their empty purses and to the detriment of their stomachs and health. And all this is taking place against the background of the good material situation of top brass and party chiefs. I think their country houses could be sold or leased to generate funds for building apartment houses for the families of officers who, after the pullout from Eastern Europe, have found themselves in the position of unbidden guests in their own country.

Our powerful military-industrial complex has completely drained the country's economy. One can easily understand why today this complex is trying to protect its original mother: she has ensured it a nice and comfortable living. But the original mother is old, decrepit and has one foot in the grave. And the new one – a market economy – intends to count up everything and, naturally, to spruce the military-industrial complex. But it has no submachine guns. The methods if used are somewhat different – they are judicious and rational. Will it be able to stand up to a man with a gun? There is also another question of no less importance: will the man with a gun be able to realize that having created a new economy he will also acquire a stronger professional army? With such an army one will be in a position to build a doctrine of an "adequate response" – with the support of the people, not contrary to their interests.

Ivan Uporov,
Major of the Interior Ministry troops, Deputy of the City Soviet
Bezmein, Turkmen SSR

Compiled by
Tatiana Chernova

HOT SPOT

Baku – Yerevan: the war begins

Azerbaijan and Armenia have started fighting. Indications are that the Kremlin has revised its initial stand of equidistance from the conflicting sides

At the beginning of May, this year, the two-year-old sluggish war between the Transcaucasian republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan aggravated to a critical point. The conflict is developing on a new level and the growing bitterness of the sides, the Kremlin's fatigue and the exhaustion of Soviet internal troops deployed in the conflict area only add fuel to the flames. New factors have appeared; first of all, the President's appeal to the people of Azerbaijan and Nagorny-Karabakh, and Armenia's refusal to participate in the Union Treaty.

Tanks and missiles...

It is becoming more and more difficult to understand what actually is going on between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The reports from the Armenian villages of Getashen and Martunashen, coming from three different sources – Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Soviet Ministry of the Interior – are so contradictory that they remind one of reports that used to come from the Iran-Iraq war. At the same time, where in the Iran-Iraq war the sides stressed the advances of their troops deeper into the hostile territory and the enemy's tremendous losses, in the current conflict each side places the main emphasis on its own losses.

Two key words are dominating the reports – deportation (the Armenian version) and militants (the Azerbaijani one).

From the viewpoint of Armenian representatives, the conflict began after President Ayaz Mutalibov of Azerbaijan conferred with representatives of the KGB, USSR Ministry of the Interior, and the Procurator's Office of the USSR. Soon after that the Azerbaijani side started massive deportations from Armenian villages and several days later used tanks and artillery to shell borderline villages inside Armenia.

According to some reports from Yerevan, Soviet internal troops were withdrawn from the Armenian villages of Getashen and Martunashen in advance and replaced with the Azerbaijani riot police (OMON), which carried out a joint operation with Azerbaijan militants leaving 20 people dead. When the internal troops returned, the OMON withdrew taking 50 hostages.

Another version, also from Yerevan, says that Soviet internal troops also participated in the storming of the villages. 17 people were killed. In Getashen the troops took away 53 hostages, while the defenders of the village also captured 13 servicemen. The village of Martunashen was razed to the ground.

On the day before the storming, Armenian protesters in Nagorny Karabakh fired several rockets against the predominantly Azerbaijani town of Shusha. Said Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia: "Our preliminary calculations indicate that 36 peaceful Armenians have been killed and more wounded since Soviet Army units, Soviet internal troops and Azerbaijani OMON mounted a combined operation on April 30. At the same time, the Armenian population's attempts at self-defence are being portrayed as militants' fighting."

The word "militants" is not to be found in any Armenian statement. Armenia is only speaking about legitimate self-defence. However, a dozen rockets launched against Shusha and 14 soldiers taken hostage by the Armenian side are hard facts. These details help to reproduce the general picture of the conflict. If the internal troops' participation in the storming of villages is a new development in the Kremlin's relations with Armenia, then the Armenian hostage-taking from among Soviet servicemen is also "a step forward." Said Premier Vazgen Manukyan of Armenia: "What the people of Getashen have done is a heroic deed. Now they are holding 12 (the figure varied depending on the source – **Ed.**) hostages from among Soviet troops. In other words, when Soviet troops entered Getashen, they were not even able to free their own men. This is not the reason for mourning, this is not a tragedy, this is struggle...".

What does Baku say? The republican authorities supported by the internal troops controlled by the Azerbaijani Ministry of the Interior and units of the

Nagorny Karabakh: herding sheep past military patrols

Soviet Army carried out a combined operation, checking the passport regime and monitoring compliance with the Soviet President's decree on disbanding illegal armed groups. This was an internal affair of Azerbaijan. During "the checking of the passport regime," Armenian militants entrenched in the villages of Getashen and Martunashen put up a bitter resistance. Using women and children as a living shield, the militants stopped an armoured personnel carrier and captured 14 servicemen. During the storming of the villages, the Azerbaijani mission in Moscow informed, 15 militants were killed, 14 wounded and 45 arrested. No civilian casualities were mentioned.

In the version of Col. Gen. Yuri Shatalin, Commander of the Internal Troops of the USSR, Armenia and Azerbaijan are waging a real war using almost all types of modern weapons and hardware. The Soviet internal troops are trying to avoid getting involved in inter-ethnic violence, but the state of emergency area is inside Azerbaijan and the internal troops are currently under the operational command of the Azerbaijani Ministry of the Interior.

"Ours" in Azerbaijan?

Several new aspects of the problem leap to the eye at once. I mean the aspects that none of the sides denies. First, the Soviet Army's and internal troops' participation in the recent Azerbaijan's operations. The legal justification of the Soviet Army involvement is Gorbachev's decree to disband and disarm all illegal armed groups. Naturally, neither the Kremlin nor Azerbaijan cannot fail to understand that the only possible Armenian interpretation of the Soviet Army involvement is that Moscow displays solidarity with Baku.

Since the very beginning of the Nagorny Karabakh crisis, the Kremlin has tried hard to remain equidistant from the conflicting sides. Indications have appeared recently, after it became clear that the sides cannot be reconciled, that Moscow is leaning to Baku, not Yerevan. Gorbachev's address devoted to Nagorny Karabakh buried the Kremlin's policy of equidistance and made it clear that Nagorny Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan.

The Gorbachev address was the factor that pushed Armenia, that declared the final solution of the Nagorny Karabakh problem the indispensable condition of Armenia's participation in the Union Treaty, to opting to stay out of the USSR. Said Levon Ter-Petrosyan: "The Armenian nation has lost faith in its participation in the Soviet Union as a guarantee of security and development of Armenia." Ter-Petrosyan declared that Armenia would be withdrawing from the USSR in the legitimate way – during the constitutional term of five years. Armenia is no Baltics and it has nowhere to hurry. Armenians make up 95 percent of the population. Any referendum in Armenia would say "No" to continued membership in the USSR.

From the point of view of Armenia, Moscow's combined action with Baku is revenge for Yerevan's independent course and separatism. Trying to find an effective conterbalance to Gorbachev, Ter-Petrosyan appealed to Boris Yeltsin.

In the light of Armenian secessionism, though, the Nagorny Karabakh conflict acquires a new dimension. It is no more an internal affair, a dispute between two Soviet republics. Armenia's claims for Nagorny Karabakh become territorial claims of a foreign country to the USSR (the decision of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia on unification of Armenia and Artsakh, the Armenian name of Nagorny Karabakh, remains in force). In the current situation, the Kremlin is justified in considering Azerbaijan one of "our" republics, while Armenia, a potentially foreign country...

There is always a possibility to refer to the duty of any state to protect its citizens. The course for secession dramatically reduces Armenia's freedom to influence the situation in Nagorny Karabakh or to take any part in the settlement of the problem in general.

The recent events have acquired one more new dimension that the Armenian leadership do their best to highlight. In their interpretation, the Nagorny Karabakh crisis is not only an inter-ethnic conflict, but also an ideological conflict between democratic Armenia and the Communist regime of Azerbaijan.

The decision of the Armenian parliament to nationalize the property of the Communist Party of Armenia could hardly improve Yerevan's relations with the Kremlin. Five days after the storming of Getashen and Martunashen Soviet paratroopers landed in Yerevan and were deployed to defend a number of the Defence Ministry instalations, including one helicopter unit stationed there. We have seen what similar actions led to in the Baltics. Unlike the Baltics, Armenia is flooded with weapons and the easily excitable Transcaucasians are a far cry from the cold-blooded and composed Balts.

Local people: the first victims of military-political games

South of Russia in fire

A state of emergency has been imposed in one more area of the USSR – the Prigorodny District in North Ossetia

The Northern Caucasus may easily be included in the *Guinness Book of Records*. There is hardly any other area in the world that could be the home of so many peoples – over fifty, actually. Today there is unrest in that huge home – old grudges, differences, disputes, problems that have been building up for decades, especially during the years of Soviet power, are staging a bloody comeback. The Northern Caucasus is also heavily affected by the uneven political life of the restive Transcaucasia.

One of the potential conflicts there is the difference between Ingushes and Ossetians which from time to time climax in ethnic violence. It was only a year ago that the Ingush-Ossetian conflict revived again. After correspondents of the Communist Party daily *Pravda* published an article about territorial disputes between the two peoples concerning the Prigorodny District, a marathon meeting started in Nazrani, the nonofficial capital of Ingushetia. The meeting and the territorial dispute attracted nation-wide attention at the Third Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. The problem was raised, but there were no special hearings on it, the deputies thought it wise not to add fuel to the flames. The press was instructed to keep calm on the matter for the same reason.

The press did keep calm, but this did not help. Clashes occurred between Ingushes and Ossetians, Ingushes and Cossacks, and a state of emergency had to be introduced in one of the districts of North Ossetia. The aggravation of relations between Georgia and South Ossetia touched off a new outburst of Ingush-Ossetian hostility.

Will there be an Ingush republic?

Usually, the conflict's history is traced back to 1957. However, we will have to start earlier, so that to have a broader view of what is going on now.

For centuries the situation in Transcaucasia and the Northern Caucasus was defined by military and political confrontation of three powers – Russia, Turkey and Iran. North Ossetia became a part of Russia in 1774 as a result of the Russian-Turkish war. Ingushes became subjects of the Russian Empire in 1810. Chechnya, the area populated by Chechens, was only conquered in 1859. The final stage of Russia's thrust into the Caucasus was the Caucasian War of 1817-1864. The Russian military planners resorted to the tactics of resettling loyal mountaineers into the valleys, while rebel villages were destroyed and the hostile population was pressed higher into the mountains. Several border lines connecting Russian outposts in the Caucasus were built – the Sunzhenskaya, Mozdokskaya, Chernomorskaya, etc. Fertile valley lands were traditionally distributed among Cossacks. It is absolutely impossible to draw any ethnic or religious borders in the region.

The revolution added some special features to the situation. National state entities started to be established in the Northern Caucasus.

The Gorskaya Autonomous Republic appeared in 1920 uniting practically all areas now belonging to the Kabardin-Balkar, Chechen-Ingush and North Ossetian Autonomous Republics. The capital city of the Gorskaya Republic was Vladikavkaz (later renamed Ordzhonikidze). Four years later the Gorskaya Republic was abolished and several autonomous regions appeared in its stead including the North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. In 1934 the Ingush Autonomous Region was united with the Chechen Autonomous Region and the resulting Checheno-Ingushetia became an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation in 1936. The city of Grozny became the capital of Checheno-Ingushetia, while Ordzhonikidze remained in North Ossetia. Until 1934 the city of Ordzhonikidze was a separate administrative entity, the seat of governments of two autonomous regions: the government institutions of the Ingush republic were located on the right bank of the Terek River, and those of North Ossetia, on the left bank. Later, Vladikavkaz (Ordzhonikidze) simultaneously belonged to North Ossetia and the Executive Committee of the Northern Caucasian Territory. Starting with 1934, though, Ingushetia had no formal connection with the city. At that time, by the way, the border line between North Ossetia and Checheno-Ingushetia was much closer to Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz) than it is now. When and how was this border reshaped?

The year of 1944 was a tragic landmark in the history of Ingushes and Chechens. Both peoples were collectivly and injustly accussed of having colloborated with the Nazis and deported to Central Asia. 1944 and everything that happened after it is an unhealing wound in the historical memory of the Ingush people. The territory of Checheno-Ingushetia was divided between Georgia, the Stavropol Territory and North Ossetia. In 1957 the autonomy of the two repressed peoples was restored and Chechens and Ingushes started returning from the exile to their native land. However, the area east of Ordzhonikidze – the Prigorodny District – remained under the authority of North Ossetia, the border was farther from the city than it had been.

The conflicts started immediately after Ingushes who had lived in the Prigorodny District before the exile, began coming back. Ossetians refused to give houses and land back to Ingushes. However, the latter continued to settle in the Prigorodny District and now Ingushes make up a considerable segment of the local population.

In 1981 the unresolved conflict provoked unrest in Ordzhonikidze (witnesses say they saw a slogan being carried all across the city, reading "Kill Ingushes!"). There were also victims among the Ossetian population.

In 1989 a congress of the Ingush people demanded the establishment of a separate Ingush Republic, including the disputed area belonging to North Ossetia and the right bank part of Ordzhonikidze. A year ago a meeting in Nazrani demanded that the Ingush autonomy be restored within the borders of 1934, before the merger with Chechnya. Today the press agrees that the declaration of an Ingush Republic is a matter of several days.

"Bones of contention"

The Ingushes demand the return of, first, the Prigorodny District, second, the right bank Vladikavkaz, and, third, as the Declaration of the Extraordinary Congress of the Ingush People to the Peoples of Caucasus put it, "considerable areas" handed over to North Ossetia after 1957.

Looking back at the history of the disputed valley, one will see one more interested party – the Terek Cossacks. It was to them that the fertile lands of the Terek Valley belonged to before 1918. During the civil war the Terek Cossacks opposed the Bolsheviks and after the Red Army moved in, they were either executed or exiled, and the valley was populated by landless mountaineers, Ossetians and Ingushes, who have fought for the Reds. That must be why the Ossetians believe that they

When a common tragedy does not unite

A killer earthquake unprecedented in eight centuries has shaken Georgia, destroying 150 villages and four towns and leaving at least 300 people dead, although it is feared that more are buried under the debris. About one thousand people have been hospitalized and seventy thousand have no shelter. Rescue teams from Armenia, Russia, Azerbaijan have rushed into the exposed areas. International aid is coming in from Switzerland, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Turkey, and the United States. The situation in South Ossetia exacerbated. A part of South Ossetia was hit by the quake, but the tragedy has not reconciled the conflicting sides and bloodshed continues. A convoy of 16 trucks carrying food and medicines from Russia could only make it to Tskhinvali through a barrage of gunfire at a second go. Georgian officials insist the roads

to Tskhinvali and Dzhava are blocked by Ossetian militants who bar relief convoys from Tbilisi from entering the disaster areas.

The ordeal is not yet over: most experts agree the tremors can continue for as long as several months.

have as much right to that area as the Ingushes do. However, the reviving community of the Terek Cossacks also has a serious say on the matter, as the recent events have convincingly demonstrated.

As for Vladikavkaz, it was initially built at the end of the 18th century as a fortress for Russian colonial troops. Today, Vladikavkaz is a multinational city, the home of Russians, Ossetians, Georgians, Armenians, and, naturally, Ingushes.

A year ago during the Nazrani meetings, a girl called me up from Vladikavkaz, asking me to write an article about the developments. "The whole Northern Caucasus is with us," the girl cried excitedly. "Everybody's condemning the Ossetians!" The meeting-makers in Nazrani waited for a Kremlin decision... It seemed so simple: a good guy from Moscow would come down and say: "Let everything be as it had been before 1934!"

During the years of perestroika we have seen many ethnic conflicts but not once has the Kremlin hinted it could change borders by its decree, giving a part of one republic's territory to another republic. The political map of the Northern Caucasus has been shaped in several decades of Soviet power. What criteria were used to change territories and borders: to set up and then abolish autonomies? The logic of former Soviet leaders is hard to understand. One thing is clear, though, self-determination of peoples was out of the question. The old Moscow policy was a totalitarian one and it is madness to demand today that Moscow return to that policy.

In practice, however, the situation defies solution... The Ingush people, which has seen so many ordeals during the years of Soviet power, continues to live with a feeling of monstrous historical injustice and it is only natural that the Ingushes want to repair that injustice at no matter what cost. The Ingushes are centred on the injustice done to them and they do not want to take into account any other considerations. This is understandable. But the matter is that each people is centred on its problems and on itself. In the past seventy years, no people has been spared injustices: are the Ossetians whose ancestors were forcefully resettled in the Prigorodny District, to blame for their living in that district now? Are the Terek Cossacks, exiled for their colloboration with the Whites, to blame? Each people has a year to which it would love to return...

Can the conflict be solved to mutual satisfaction?

What if the district remained under the jurisdiction of North Ossetia but North Ossetian authorities would not bar Ingushes from returning to their native lands and would guarantee all their rights? This variant does not satisfy the Ingushes. What they would prefer, is to see the district a part of Ingushetia with guaranteed rights of the Ossetian population. After the conflict in South Ossetia this scenario does not seem very realistic. The Ingushes are the only Northern Caucasian people supporting the policy of the Georgian leadership. The motives are self-evident – the anti-Ossetian syndrome, although this stance is counterproductive for the Ingush people from the point of view of practical politics. The Ingushes need peace and order beyond the Caucasus more than any other people. The worse is the situation in South Ossetia (now it has been aggravated by an earthquake) the more Ossetian refugees will be arriving in Vladikavkaz. The leadership of North Ossetia can now cite a convincing argument in favour of their reluctance to part with the disputed district – North Ossetia needs space to resettle the refugees.

One more powder keg

There is a danger of the Ingushes' trying to solve the problem relying on their own forces only. Said the Declaration of the Extraordinary Congress of the Ingush People published in Georgian press: "Like other Caucasian peoples, the current generation of the Ossetian people must return what does not belong to it. If this does not happen, the Ingush people will not be responsible for the possible consequences..." The danger of an ethnic explosion is being aggravated by the growing influx of Ossetian refugees to North Ossetia who change the demographic balance in the republic in favour of the Ossetians.

The Ingushes will hardly be able to recapture the lands they want so much. The Ossetians will hardly be able to keep those lands. This means that the current conflict will evolutionize into years of Karabakh-type terror from both sides. The Soviet Army and the neighbouring peoples – Chechens and Cossacks will not remain uninvolved, the more so as the conflicting sides will start seeking allies. Today, the Ingushes are allied with Georgia in the struggle against the Ossetians. As they have repeatedly stressed, the Ossetians are proud of years of friendship with Russia... The conflict will become years-long no-win war which will claim a lot of lives.

Describing ethnic differences in his republic, a *NT* reader from Dagestan wrote: "The real powder keg is the Northern Caucasus, not Transcaucasia."

Marina Shakina

Too strong power will prove weak

Andrei Zubov,
Alexei Salmin,
Leon Taivan

According to the Statement of Ten, the Union Treaty will be finalized and signed in the near future. Below, experts in ethnic relations share their views on the draft Treaty.

The draft Treaty of the Union was expected to rectify our all but desperate situation. Actually, the record of the past decades of our life, of perestroika, of inter-republican and ethnic conflicts, let alone the world record of settling matters in communities like ours, found almost no reflection in the articles and paragraphs of the new draft Treaty. Behind its lines one can clearly discern the desire to "leave well alone" or, at any rate, a dread of changes in the structure which has taken shape, the structure which has almost disintegrated and which is bound to disappear soon even without the legislators' sanction.

How to avoid new Karabakhs

Since the outbreak of the "Karabakh conflict," lawyers have pointed out that from the legal viewpoint its source lies in a clash between two constitutional rights: the nations' right to self-determination, on the one hand, and the Union Republics' right to their territorial integrity, on the other. Armenia appealed to the former principle, and Azerbaijan stood on the latter. Such a constitutional collision was made inevitable by the structure of the USSR which had taken shape by the moment of signing the 1922 Treaty.

The thing is that in our country the nations' rights became firmly linked with certain territories. Tataria, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Estonia and other republics declared their sovereignty over their respective lands. But since we have no mono-ethnic territories, and most nations have spilled over into regions well outside "their own" territories, no part of the country can be reserved exclusively for a certain nation in this system, and no nation can make itself a self-governing community confined to the limits of territories alloted them by no matter whom and no matter when. This did not embarrass at all the legislators who laid the legal ground-work for the USSR. On the contrary, such a system seemed to be eminently suitable for the earliest possible erosion of ethnic "partitions" in the communist society of the future. It was precisely for fear of the conservation of ethnic distinctiveness that the Bolsheviks rebelled against the nations' right to cultural-ethnic autonomy. In a situation, however, when the once dormant laws came to life, this legal "stratagem" resulted in endless conflicts, hundreds of thousands of refugees and, last but not least, a real danger of our state falling apart.

Lest the legal deadlock like that in Karabakh should ever be reached anywhere else, it is necessary to declare the primacy of either the nations' self-determination principle, or of the principle of a Republic's full sovereignty over its entire territory and population. In the preamble to the draft of the Union Treaty, both these principles stand side by side, but neither is given preference. As far as the present situation in Moldova is concerned, for instance, it is necessary either to recognize the Gagauzes' right to decide their own fate (to remain part of Moldova, to declare their independence, to accede to any other ethnic community), or to proclaim that the resolution adopted by parliament in Kishinev is obligatory for those people and that they cannot change their status without its sanction. The draft contains both of these provisions, which is either a mistake due to oversight, or an ill-conceived "stratagem": the centre reserves the freedom to manipulate with both principles.

This problem is related to another one, "dissolved" in the wording of the fifth principle. If the Republics may change their state system and their administrative-territorial division on their own, the fate of the autonomous formations in them depends solely on the will of the Republics' parliaments. And what about the nations' right to decide their own fates? Doesn't that threaten new Karabakhs?

Republics within Republics

The clash between Articles 1.2 and 4.2 is a hard legacy of the Stalin and pre-Stalin epochs. The former stipulates that the Republics shall sign the Treaty either directly, or as parts of other Republics. The latter says that all the parties to the Treaty are equal. The principle of inequality between Union and Autonomous Republics, on the one hand, and the Autonomous Regions and Autonomous Districts, on the other, seems to have been censured hundreds of times. Many autonomies have declared their "sovereignty." Judging by everything, Territories and Regions of larger Republics are to follow suit. With an amazing consistency, however, the draft ignores this reality and takes us back to the epoch of the previous constitutions which, on some obscure grounds, granted different rights to different



Drawing by Sergei Khasabov

peoples, and made no mention at all of peoples like the Gagauzes for instance, and tens of others.

The distribution of legislative powers between the federal authorities and the subjects of the federation is a matter of vital importance. The Union Treaty may list only the legislative powers of the Union and declare that all the other legislative powers are to be kept by the subjects of the federation. Three lists can be made up – those of the legislative powers of the Union, of the constituent Republics, and those coming within their joint jurisdiction. The only unreasonable thing to do is to lay the main emphasis on the list olf "mixed powers", but Article 5 does just that.

Let me quote a phrase the specific meaning of which is anybody's guess. "The Republics," the phrase goes, "take part in exercising the powers of the USSR through the joint formation of joint federal bodies and creating other mechanisms and procedures of coordinating interests and actions." As it is now, Article 5 will give rise to no end of disputes and arbitrariness of the Constitutional Court which, incidentally, is of a largely mysterious origin (the principles underlying the formation of the Constitutional Supervision Committee contradict the spirit of even the draft in question).

A punishment for the Republics

The sanctions to be applied against the subjects of the Federation which violate the Union Treaty deserve special mention. The November version of the draft says that such violations should carry the expulsion from the Union (Article 1.4). This measure is not an extreme, but also an impossible one. People can bear responsibility for their government's actions only in the case of full solidarity with it. If a "guilty subject" is to be expelled at all, this measure should be preceded by disbanding its parliament and by re-elections, at least or, better still, by a referendum. The removal of this article from the final draft is worthy of every praise, but there remains a blank instead, and the Union has no legal way of influencing the Republics.

Section III of the draft, which describes the government and control bodies, looks inadequate. Let us give the authors their due: they have tried to depart somewhat from the worst elements of the structure formed by the 1977 Constitution and from the 1988 amendments to it. Gone are the Congress of People's Deputies and the practice of representing public organizations at it, and the procedure of forming the Soviet of Nationalities has been changed.

As compared with the first variant of the draft which provided for delegating deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities (now the Soviet of the Republics), the new one is an improvement: it says that the delegates should be elected, after all. For all these positive changes, the arrangement suggested is a rather loose and unbalanced one and will hardly be able to work along legitimate lines. To begin with, the draft does not say as much as a word about any delimitation of the chambers' functions apart from the remark made in one of the two wordings of Article 12.2 to the effect that the Soviet of the Replublics is "the upper chamber". The non-delimitation of powers will inevitably lead to chaos and weaken the Supreme Soviet of the Union as a working body considerably. If parliament is weak, with its chambers paralyzing one another, separatist tendencies will become even more strongly pronounced. This matter merits serious consideration.

Who will protect the rights of the Soviet Japanese?

All this does not exhaust the Soviet of the Republics problem. In what way will it rep-

resent the territories where the indigenous population is in the minority? Who will represent Adygea, for instance? The Adyges, who constitute 22 percent of their Autonomous Region's population (according to the latest census), or the Russians, whose percentage of the total there amounts to 68? What about Yakutia, with its population 33 percent Yakutian and 50 percent Russian? It should be borne in mind that in this country legislative bodies are formed at contested elections, and that votes are contested by ethnic groups, as a rule; therefore, the Adyges who express the will of their people rather than the will of the Russian majority stand a very slim chance of winning the elections – which, naturally, causes outbursts of extreme, extra-parliamentary nationalism.

Who will represent and protect the interests in the Supreme Soviet, of the large ethnic groups who have found themselves in the minority in certain republics – I mean the Russians in Estonia and Tuva, the Armenians in Georgia and Azerbaijan? Russian deputies? Armenian deputies? They are supposed to be preoccupied with the affairs of their own republics and to implement the will of their electors rather than to interfere in the affairs of other states. Otherwise, Russia's parliament will become a parliament of all the Russians, and Armenia's parliament – a parliament of all the Armenians. This does not make sense legally, and is impracticable. The ethnic and territorial principles of statehood have to be divided and well-balanced. The practice of mixing them up is fraught, in a democratic state, with endless and intense conflicts. The attemtps to do without one of them (ethnic) will hardly rectify the situation. The Armenians' interests ought to be upheld by the Armenians, not by Armenia, while the Armenian parliament should make laws for the benefit of all the citizens of that republic irrespective of their nationality, religion and language. Has this principle been provided for in the draft? Not at all.

It is true that Article 11.3 of the November draft did contain the following mysterious phrase: "Representation of all the peoples of the USSR in the Soviet of Nationalities is guaranteed." Two questions arise in this connection: first, who will provide such a guarantee and, second, how will this representation be guaranteed? And further questions: who are these representatives of all the peoples going to be, how will they be elected, and by whom? By their respective peoples, or by the population of their territories – or, will they be nominated in the spirit of the good old command-administrative system? In the latter case, who will nominate them, and on the basis of what?

According to the 1989 census, the population of the Soviet Union consists of 137 nationalities and ethnic groups. Actually, there are more peoples than that, plus ethno-confessional groups such as Sunnit Kurds and Yazid Kurds. But even this is not the case in point. If all the ethnic groups are to be represented, then this number should include the Liives, of whom there are 200, and the Japanese, of whom there are 691. Is that a realistic proposition?

Our legislative authorities have decided to deal with this problem by sacrificing the federal guarantees of the peoples' rights and giving complete control over there ethnic groups to the republics (to Georgia, over South Ossetia's Ossetians; to Azerbaijan, over Nagorny Karabakh's Armenians; to the Lithuanian Republic, over Srotkowa Lithuania). And instead of the former "mysterious phrase" a new one appeared: "The Republics guarantee all the ethnic groups residing on their territories political rights and opportunities for socio-economic and cultural progress." (The second basic principle.) Who guarantees that, and how are these guarantees to be fulfilled?

Deputies' duplicates

No matter how the Supreme Soviet works, the duplication of its functions is the most dangerous practice of all. The Council of the Federation (Article 15), consisting of the Presidents of the Republics and headed by the President of the Union, figures in the draft as a duplicate body.

The Council of the Federation is intended "to deal with the principal problems connected with home and foreign policy of the Union, the coordination of the Republics' actions, the adjustment of relations between the Union and individual republics."

What are, then, the functions of the Soviet of the Republics and of the Supreme Soviet as a whole then? Are they to rubber-stamp the laws which the Presidents have agreed upon coordinating their actions? This amounts to discrediting parliament which may finally rebel as it repeatedly has over the centuries.

As if on purpose, the entire draft is based upon clashes between norms and principles. The President is to be popularly elected, and so is Parliament (the Council of the Union, at any rate.) Two legislatures being in opposition to one another is quite dangerous in itself, always and everywhere, except in the countries where matters of procedure are all but held sacred. Of special danger is the direct election of President in our state which, for all its ethnic heterogeneity, is Russian-speaking on the whole. Most of the national-territorial formations are Russian-speaking, and the peoples these formations are named after are in the minority. Will the non-Russian-speaking ethnic groups regard such a President as their own? Or will he remain an alien, "Russian" President? This is a serious danger further added to by the inevitability of the Russian-speaking people's majority in the Soviet of the Union.

What will happen if the Presidents comprising the Council of the Federation fail to reach an agreement (a prospect which is not altogether unlikely)? How will decisions be passed there: by a majority vote, by consensus? Or is the Council of the Federation merely an "alter ego" of the President, and the latter can, in principle, adopt decisions at the Council of the Federation "unanimously" even if the leaders of all the Republics vote against them? But if the Council of the Federation is a merely consultative body, then the President possesses "supreme executive and administrative power," and the cabinet of ministers he forms "in coordination" (what does that mean, incidentally?) with the Supreme Soviet serves as his own "lever of government."

A temptation for parliament

The result is a striking concentration of power which may scare anyone, although there is really no cause for concern. Built-in inefficacy will doom anyone's attempts to seize the reins of government, if the latter was the purpose of the draft's authors.

The Council of the Federation has vague powers. This is bad, of course, but will it gather any quorum at all? How many leaders of the republics will it comprise – fifteen, thirty-five, fifty-three or 170-odd? As to the Cabinet of Ministers, open to the heads of the republics' governments and offering them the deciding vote (Article 16.2) – how efficient will it turn out to be? Unfortunately, the maximum concentration of power in the hands of the head of state does not make the entire system of supreme power more effective; on the contrary, it puts the President in an extremely vulnerable and even helpless position. It is the President, and not his Prime-Minister, who will bear the responsibility for any move the government he has formed will make. Besides, such a government "is accountable to the Supreme Soviet for its actions." (Article 16.3). Won't this tempt parliament, whose rights have been seriously curtailed by the Council of the Federation, to express itself, i.e. the will of its electors, in the only way accessible to it – by constantly keeping the President's government under the threat of a no-confidence vote?

An unpredictable Council of Federation; an ill-structured but possibly aggressive Supreme Soviet; an irresponsible (morally, at least) Prime-Minister, actually bound hand-and-foot, at the head of a flabby and inflated government; and finally, an amazingly vulnerable President – this is what we shall get if the draft Treaty of the Union goes into effect.

Seeking a fourth way

Nikolai Gulbinsky

The first way is capitalism, the second is real socialism, the third is European social democracy. The world Trotskyites are satisfied with none of them

If the forces advocating the return to parliamentary democracy take the upper hand in the Soviet Union, this will lead to restoration of capitalism, because parliamentary democracy is based on private ownership of the means of production. However, it is more likely that restoration of capitalism will not be accompanied by affirmation of democracy: at the initial stage undemocratic capitalism will suit the new class of proprietors more.

The reader may think this is a quotation from Ivan Polozkov's speech at the recent plenum, or from a leaflet issued by the United Front of the Working People. Guess again. The words are from Leon Trotsky's "What has happened and how?" dated 1929.

Leon Trotsky and Ivan Polozkov

And these are the words of the democratic people's deputy Bocharov: "I do not know who will come – a Roh-Tae-Woo or a Pinochet – but we need a strong executive branch that will put forward a realistic programme to implement the planned reforms." Sounds nice, doesn't it? And which is more important, it sounds exactly in line with what Trotsky predicted back in 1929. If we ignore Bocharov's speculations about the necessity to preserve political democracy (under a Pinochet?), what are Pinochet-type regimes? Capitalism without democracy. It must also be noted that in the West the advocates of Pinochets and "lovers of authoritarian modernizations," as one Soviet conservative happily put it, do not call themselves democrats.

Once again, let us recall Leon Trotsky's words about the possibility of a repeat "evolution of capitalism in Russia." Restoration of capitalism is possible, but what kind of capitalism will it be? Advanced Western-type capitalism? But the markets and spheres of interests in the world are already divided and the newcomers are not exactly welcome there. The second edition of capitalism in the Soviet Union will be the backward, dependent and semi-colonial brand of capitalism. Something resembling pre-revolutionary Russia or colonial India/Restoration of capitalism does not necessarily have to be the result of an imperialist intervention. A better way to smuggle capitalism back is "the intervention of cheap goods" into the Soviet market. It is highly likely that bogged in unending problems and feeling the inevitable loss of political power, the ruling Soviet bureaucracy will try to become "the class of new proprietors," while restoration of capitalism will be conducted by the ruling bureaucracy under the slogan of "returning to the fold of Western civilization" and with the active support of imperialism...

Actually, these reflections by Leon Trotsky are not very different from the accusations the hard-liners levelled at "the architects of perestroika" – Aleksandr Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Stanislav Shatalin and, until very recently, Mikhail Gorbachev himself. Naturally, many of the Soviet hard-liners who miss no chance to castigate Trotsky, while they have never read a word of what Trotsky had written, would be shocked to know that their arguments are almost a word-to-word retelling of the views of "the Russophobic cosmopolitan."

There are signs that Trotskyism is gaining more and more followers in this country. As for the rest of the world, Leon Trotsky's ideas have been generating massive political movements there. Today, when the Soviet Union is at the crossroads trying to find the optimal way of socio-economic development and to reconcile the socialist choice with a free market, it may be instructive to familiarize ourselves with the views advocated by Trotskyites across the globe.

No visas for Trotskyites

The political movement Militant first formed in Great Britain in the mid-1960s. Initially, it was a left-wing trend in the Labour Party, but later the party leadership decided it was wiser to abandon most of their restive allies and expelled the leaders of Militant from the LP. Actually, the respected reform-minded bourgeois party stood nothing to win associating itself with a group theoretically loyal to the ideas of Marx–Lenin–Trotsky and whose practical objective was a social revolutionn in the West and promotion of a political anti-bureaucratic revolution in the East.

Unlike other such movements, Militant is uncharacteristically large and boasts a following of about 6.000, the exact figure being difficult to check, though. It is difficult to assess the real political influence of the movement, but Militant leaders insist their movement was in the vanguard of the struggle against the poll tax, the struggle that vastly contributed to the eventual resignation of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher – the living symbol of the neo-conservative offensive.

As a rule, members of such movements have



Drawing by Sergei Khasabov

a pitiful fate in the conditions of a bipolar world. The democratic West is not really so democratic towards those who do not obide by the rules of "consensus democracy" (the politological term defining a political system where most participants of the political game never question the basic rules of that game).

The Trotskyites could neither count on the support of "the most progressive force of the modern epoch" – the Soviet bloc – because unlike the flexible Eurocommunists, they never regarded the Soviet bloc countries are genuinely socialist. Cliff Slouter, the political Secretary of the Revolutionary Labour Party of Great Britain once observed bitterly that he had been refused an entry visa to the United States for 20 years because of his being a Trotskyite. At the same time, The Soviet Union refused to let him in for exactly the same reason.

Computers and control

The remarkable thing is that Leninists-Trotskyites from Militant are cool towards the Communist Party of Russia, the United Front of Working People and other similar organizations and forces, despite the seeming similarity of views. They regard those organizations' activities not as the implementation of a political anti-bureaucratic revolution, but as a counter process – protection of the bureaucracy and the totalitarian dominance over the working people sing all ways, including political deception.

The stance of Yeltsin, Popov, Sobchak and the whole of The Demokraticheskaya Rossiya movement, does not make Militant followers too enthusiastic either: they view it as a return to the worst forms of capitalist market.

As for the attitude to the market, the British fundamentalists are more cons stent than their Russian counterparts: they believe that the market will not be needed in future socialist society, except for some elements of it. I asked Lynn Walsh, chief editor of the theoretical mouthpiece Militant International about how he saw an effective economy without a free market?

"Why do you think that the objective cannot be consciencious organization of society? Evidently, the only reason why you should think so is the fact that the very first attempt to build socialism in a backward country, in the context of Stalinist bureaucratic dominance and the ruinous course for self-isolationism and complete rejection of the ideas of Lenin-Trotsky about the world revolution failed so ignominously? Computers and democratic control can replace the chaotic mechanism that formed in the 15th century. Naturally, Soviet advocates of free market capitalism have a trump card of an argument – even the most advanced computer cannot plan everything – from the production of aircraft to making brooms. But we do not say it is possible or needed. The centre will plan the main guidelines of economic development. Local economic authorities will then cooperate with the broad masses of working people and decide what is to be produced. In general the faith that free market is a universal cure belongs to the sphere of political mythology. In the West the state plays a tremendous part in the economic life. In any cases when countries leapt from backwardness into the modern time, the leading role in this process belonged to the state, and not to the so-called free market forces. It happened in Japan, it happened in the post-war Europe. And now let's look at the weak countries. Free market is no success there. Brazil, Argentina, Colombia – where is the economic prosperity promised by the neo-liberals? There is no trace of it. Instead, there is dramatic social stratification (in Brazil the gap between the profits of the richest and the poorest strata is the widest in the world), barbaric exploitation of the environment (massive cutting of woods in Brazil), catastrophic levels of crime and unprecedented influence of mafia structures (Colombia) and poverty.

Lynn believes that this is the prosperity promised by the economic programmes of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, between which he does not see much difference. However, Lynn gives the democrats their due – after all their struggle for freedom of speech and multiparty system is a positive attitude.

I made one more attempt to defend the free market democracy.

"Perhaps, a free market economy will not make our country prosperous overnight. But at least it will be guarantee against totalitarianism. After all, private property is the foundation of the individual's political independence."

"This is naive, to say the least (it was obvious that Lynn had heard a lot of such arguments during his short trip to the USSR). Who said no one gets perse-

cuted for political convictions in the West? Members of our movement have been sacked and it was only due to the strength of the working class movement that we succeeded in getting our comrades back to their jobs, not to private property. Wherever the ruling class has managed to crush the workers' movement, cruel dictatorships set in which comfortably co-exist with private property. The latest example is Chile."

Several days after I spoke to the leader of Militant I attended a meeting of the radical organization Moskovskaya Tribuna. The very fist speaker, Aleksandr Shubin, representative of the Anarcho-Syndicalists, reproduced Lynn Walsh's basis arguments: there are no strategic differences between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, although Yeltsin's programme is more attractive. However, the 500-day programme of economic recovery would have ruined ecology and brought the country back to capitalism and dependence on the West...

Theoretically, the third way is sought not only by the Anarcho-Syndicalysts and the Greens; in practice they can count on the support of those who are dissatisfied with the mainstream political blocs.

Strictly speaking, it is not even a third, but a fourth way, for the third way is the way of the West European socio-democracy. This way is attractive in many respects but there is one serious problem: to be effective, West European socio-democracy needs an advanced stage of capitalism, because all economic programmes of socio-democrats stipulate redistribution of wealth, which is impossible without an abundance of goods and services. But the fourth way advocated by Militant can hardly be attractive for most Soviets whose experience speaks against such basic Trotskyite ideas as an enhanced role of the state, rejection of free market economy, and rigid centralized planning...

Chile, South Korea... and the USSR

Until very recently the real political conflict in the world was unfolding between two forces – democracy and totalitarianism, the free world and the evil empire, if you like. One may go to any length speculating that a United States-type democracy is no democracy because it does not provide for a real political choice. That the invasion to Grenade is hardly compatible with international law and the support of the Pinochet regime in Chile has nothing in common with the declared advocation of human rights across the world. Both systems – the totalitarian and democratic ones – were guided by their own logic and the choice was only between the two. President Reagan did not want to see any more Castro-like dictatorships on the US threshold or to lose strategic outposts in Central America or the Middle East, and he was absolutely right from the point of view of his logic. The Kremlin Olympians understood that the Prague Spring was in effect the beginning of the end of the "socialist system" and were absolutely logical when they sent tanks into Czechoslovakia.

The influence of the bipolar logic could have convinced some people that Pinochet had really saved Chile from Communism, while Generalissimo Franco was en embodiment of democracy. Today the question is whether one can afford to remain in the rigid framework of the bipolar thinking?

Some democratic media insist that nothing will change for the better in this country as long as the Communists remain at the help. How could one object to this? In a democracy, it is only natural to want to see one's political rivals out of power: otherwise what is the sense of political struggle? As for the speculations about "the communists' being removed from the political arena," they can hardly be reconciled with real democracy. However, one recent publication cited an example of effective countermeasures taken to overcome the "Communist chaos." When were such measures taken? In Chile, after the Pinochet coup.

Such speculations reveal the deep-rooted understanding of the very nature of political conflicts that can be traced back to the Bolsheviks. Lenin and his followers saw the solution of any conflict in the elimination of one of the conflicting parties. At that time, the ones to be destroyed were "the bourgeois classes"... In his work "Economics of a Transition Period," Nikolay Bukharin listed about thirty categories of people "hostile to the proletariat." Today this understanding of political struggle is overcome almost everywhere. In the West, that is. The West has seen examples of successful peaceful transitions from authoritarianism (totalitarianism?) to democracy. In Spain the followers of Franco were not labelled enemies of the nation and nobody demanded that Francoists be "removed from the political arena." After all they were living people, not abstract "opponents of democracy." Instead, Spain made a difficult search for an acceptable social compromise. One can only wish this experience were needed in this country...

Should we become another Sweden?

The search for a fourth way will continue, no matter now different the political attitudes to such a search may be. The pro-democracy forces in this country should not try to herd all their followers into the rigid "neoliberal" schemes. The task of a political movement or a party is to attract potential allies, not to scare them off. So far, the democrats in the USSR have been more successful in the latter, as they hastened to live up to Lenin's commandment and to divide as soon as possible. But in the event of the victory of the already visible neototalitarian bloc, the difference between the Greens, and the Socialists, for instance will immediately lose all practical significance, and their disputes will at best continue at the underground level.

It is nice, of course, to convene somewhere in Britain and to discuss ways to overcome the "chaotic" free market and the "imperfect" parliamentary democracy. But it is only possible when both free market and parliamentary democracy are already a reality, because the question of a fourth way can seriously be raised only in the framework of a free market parliamentary democracy.

Recently, an important figure of the Humanitarian Movement told us: why should the Soviet Union want to become a freemarket democracy, like Sweden, for instance? After all, Sweden has the world's record suicide statistics, the highest level of per capita alcohol consumption and the greatest per capita number of policemen? Man is no happier in Sweden, but what is more important than happiness?

I must admit, these speculations reminded me of one character of Chekhov's who thought there was no great difference between his cosy study and the dirty ward in a mental home, for happiness is inside man, not around man.

In principle, this is right. By themselves, neither free market, nor parliamentary democracy can make anyone happy. There are only the coordinates in which the individual can freely associate with other individuals in order to advocate "informal" democracy, "rational planned" economy, a third, a fourth or any other way of development – briefly, the ideal society as that individual sees it.



Cartoon from Newsweek (USA)

Five lives of Mikhail Gorbachev

Interview with **Gail SHEEHY** on her book *The man who changed the world: The lives of Mikhail Gorbachev*

New Times. Why did you decide to write a book about Gorbachev, and what was the moment of inspiration?

Gail Sheehy. When I interviewed Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in early 1989, I was struck by the passion with which she spoke about Gorbachev. She saw him as a kindred revolutionary spirit. But what had formed his character? I wondered.

N.T. How difficult was it to get information about Gorbachev?

G.S. Gorbachev has never had to answer to the people for his policies the way Western political leaders do in a political campaign, much less face the test of an open election. I was amazed at how little was known about him by his own aides and press establishment; for example that he had lived in an area occupied briefly by German forces.

Yevtushenko advised me: "If you want to find the key to a man's soul, look into his childhood eyes. Gorbachev was from a farmer's family, he saw through the eyes of his father how agriculture was destroyed, then the disaster of village life after the Second World War."

I found that President Gorbachev's cooperation was necessary before anyone would dare to talk to me. He made it possible for me to visit his home village of Privolnoye and interview his childhood comrades. They surprised me by being very open. I learned about the arrest of Gorbachev's grandfather as a kulak and the split in his family.

I also realized that connections are everything in the Soviet Union. One person passed me to another. I was able to find and interview all those in Gorbachev's close circle at Moscow State University law faculty; then spent time in Stavropole and the Mineralnye Vody spa area to talk to party members who worked with him while he was climbing up to First Secretary; and finally followed Gorbachev himself on his trips abroad and studied him at the Congress of People's Deputies. I also spent some hours with his chief confidant, Alexander Yakovlev. In all, I interviewed 102 Soviets and over 50 American and European experts who have dealt with Gorbachev, and made extensive trips to the Soviet Union to retrace his footsteps.

N.T. Other books have been written about Gorbachev. What was special about your plan to write a book?

G.S. I soon learned that there is not one Gorbachev, but many. In my view, he has already had at least five lives. He has repeatedly recast his personality to accommodate to shifts of power: evolving from a romantic and hot-tempered peasant boy whose ancestors were fiercely independent cossacks; to a conformist at university who was in training as a first-generation apparatchik; to an opportunist as a territorial party boss, who rose above his obscure and politically ambiguous background with iron self-discipline and a gift for ingratiating himself with the right people – notably Mikhail Suslov and Yuri Andropov. Since 1985, he has hurtled from disciple to reformer, from reformer to revolutionary, and starting in the spring of 1990, from revolutionary to a "dictator for democracy." He has been in a race with history.

The theory for which I am known, as the author of *Passages,* is that each of us develops throughout adulthood by stages. Between each stage are points of decision between progress and regression where we are challenged to shed a protective structure, and when we do we are left exposed and vulnerable, but also capable of stretching and growing in ways we hadn't known before. For exceptional individuals, like Gorbachev, such passages assume the dimensions of deep personal transformations – they become in some ways different people. And those leaps of inner psychological development ultimately become the catalyst for a transformation of the society out of which they come. It allows the pathleader, like Gorbachev, to perform creative actions that cause leaps of growth in human societies.

Gorbachev is attempting a transformation no less stunning than Peter the Great's dismantling of the patrimonial state or the topdown revolution launched by Alexander II when he freed the serfs

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Gail Sheehy is one of the most well-known American non-fiction authors.

Gail Sheehy's attention has always been focused on politicians. Her political profiles of George Bush, Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, have impressed readers by psychological profundity, precise details and the author's talented depiction of the atmosphere of political struggle.

in 1861. But while Gorbachev's revolution has destroyed the ideology of the Bolshevik Revolution, he has not yet found the belief system to put in its place.

Usually a great leader faces a cruel repudiation or a devastating personal setback, and only after a period "in the wilderness" of self-contemplation and despair does he or she return to make the ultimate transformation of the society. Franklin Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle, Gandhi, and Sadat all exemplify this dynamic. Rarely does a leader have to undergo the radical inner transformation while managing a revolution. This is what has made Gorbachev a tormented leader.

My plan was to write about Gorbachev's many lives, to track the remarkable ways in which he has changed and the fateful ways in which he has not changed.

N.T. Gorbachev's image in the West is very different from his image at home. What do you think about this split?

G.S. For a cork on the river of history, Gorbachev has been a mightly force. In the brief period of relative calm between 1985 and the start of a new decade, this man whose temperature always seemed a little higher than normal saw the chance to reverse the arms race and engineer the end of the Cold War. For this, Gorbachev will be honored as much as any man or woman in the twentieth century for changing the flow of history.

It would be hard to exaggerate the contrast between the Gorbachev who has performed with such cool brilliance abroad and the emotional man who has lurched in every direction in the attempt to perform a revolution at home. On the great stage of fools where high political drama is played out, Gorbachev is a tragic hero of Shakespearean dimension. With each spasm by which his own paralysis has shrunk his actual authority, Gorbachev has desperately engineered more paper powers for himself and reverted to the institutions of control and repression from which he came – the party and the KGB. From an impassioned and indecisive Hamlet he is fast aging in a King Lear who rages to prove he is still "every inch a king," even as he protests too much that "I am not a dictator."

N.T. As you tour around the U.S. to talk about your book, what are the most frequently asked questions?

G.S. Why don't the Soviet people appreciate Gorbachev for opening up their society and giving them their tongues. They also always ask, very apprehensively: Can he survive? Will he remain true to his reforms, or must he turn into a repressor?

N.T. What are the two or three most striking things about Gorbachev that stick in your memory?

G.S. First, I think it's interesting that all his life Mikhail Sergeyevich has been nurtured by strong woman, beginning with his mother. He spent his adolescence literally working shoulder to shoulder with her in the fields while his father was away at the front. He seems to have inherited a hot temper from her, which he learned to control. His mother passed him on to Raisa, who some say is more ambitious even than he. She is his speech coach, his intuitive reader of people, his sounding board in all political affairs. On foreign trips she often sits in on preliminary meetings. At the first Washington summit, Raisa stayed in the room with top officials, beside Ambassador Dobrynin, while Gorbachev talked with Secretary of State George Schultz. Gorbachev calls her, only partly in jest, "my general."

I also talk in my book about his inner struggle. He learned very early to live with two opposite ideas at the same time. In order to survive collectivization, one side of his family went along with the government and suppressed other farmers in the village. Grandfather Gorbachev held out for principle, and refused to give up his chicken and pigs, and was punished for it as an "enemy of the people." These two conflicting life lessons have always been in Gorbachev's mind. He could compose them as long as he had a hardliner on one side and a progressive on the other; he could manoeuvre brilliantly between the two opposing political forces without ever having to make a final decision. But once the society polarized, the two sides of his split personality could no longer be held in the balance. Now he stands alone, and seems able only to sell his soul to the devil.

Interviewed by
Nataliya Darialova
NEW YORK

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Our Horst Wessel

Of the dead, either good or nothing. However, this ancient maxim is overshadowed by the political wrangle, wherein it is customary to manipulate with the dead



Though sentenced Ostashvili put on a brave front accepting bouquets from fans. So why did he hang himself in the prison colony? Out of sudden fit of depression?

Will Konstantin Ostashvili become a new Horst Wessel? He seems to have everything thereto.

Konstantin Ostashvili, one of the leaders of the popular-Orthodox Pamiat movement who was given a two-year sentence for organizing a pogrom at the Moscow Writers' Club, hanged himself in a Tver prison colony. Its chief and the local procurator averred that there was no reason to doubt that he had committed suicide of his own volition without any external pressure or assistance. However, our national socialists won't hear this, as in their view he was put to death by Jews whose "long arm" had reached him even in the penitentiary.

Fair-weather friends

I really do not know whether any psychoanalyst would wish to fathom why the "hero" of one of the most sensational trials of late, who in prison whiled away the time with a murderer and a bribe taker, had hanged himself. Could this have been the upshot of a cruel insult from a prison mate? Inasmuch as fooled by his non Arian features one had dubbed Ostashvili, that champion of the Russian idea, a "Yid." Or was the noose the logical end to the life of a chronic dispomaniac?

His death was written up in all Moscow-based newspapers. Isn't that a bit too much? The same question was put a year ago when for the duration of several weeks the Moscow City Court considered the events of one January day when some fifty hoods turned up at the Central Writers' Club to "beat up the Jews."

Despite objections from the civilian prosecutors, who demanded that the forces behind the national socialist movement be nailed, only Ostashvili landed in the dock. The pseudopatriotic media averred that this was a political travesty of justice and that he was being tried for his views, not for a criminal act.

Ostashvili was brought to trial not because he was a pathological anti-Semite but because he sought to put his views to practice, which at once implied a criminal offence.

Naturally he was sure he would not be touched. Not only out of his brazen impudence. He shouted to a policeman: "I'm a deputy and enjoy immunity!" Upon which the policeman, demonstrating a humility rare for this calling, released him, though Ostashvili never was a deputy. Ostashvili had trusted in the strength and reliability of the like-minded, but they betrayed him.

The weekly *The Veteran* denied him the right to call himself a patriot, as it transpired that his grandmother's name had been Stoltenberg. He alleged that she was just a German, though he ought to have borne it in mind that "patriots" would only laugh at such a justification. Further, Dmitry Vasiliev, his comrade in the joint drive against Zionism and democracy, the head of another Pamiat wing, completely disavowed him, claiming: "The absolutely crazy Ostashvili-Smirnov had gathered around himself a handful of youngstrs who did not realize that they were but pawns in the hands of a cheap trickster... The paradox is that he was not even a Georgian and, as I was told, pardon me, well-nigh a Jew, had undertaken to uphold the honour of Russia. He is nothing but a provocateur."

The rallying power of death

Now that Ostashvilli is dead, he is again trotted out as hero, inasmuch as the national socialists in this country need a Horst Wessel of their own.

Before student drop-out Horst Wessel, chief of a stormtroopers unit in the Berlin Friedrichsein district was gunned down by Albrecht (Ali) Hohler, who had sixteen convictions to his credit, it would not have entered any head to glamorize him as hero. However, Goebbels the newly appointed head of the Berlin party organization, who was also responsible for propaganda, immediately seized the opportunity.

Wessel was lush pimp and punk before he died. But after his death, he was held up an ardent national socialist murdered by Jews and Communists.

"Horst Wessel marches with us," Goebbels said at the funeral. "When factory

Stormfuhrer Wessel with his men, whose usual tactics were to fall upon outnumbered opponents

workers and students will march in the future they will sing his 'Raise the Banner High!', which he composed in an inspired hour a year before he died."

That occurred in the beginning of 1930, when nobody thought the Nazis would ever usurp power.

Horst Wessel was transformed into a fighter for an awakening Germany, into a hero, whom the entire German youth were to venerate. "Wessel is the chosen, ordained to die in terrible agony, so that his death awaken and rally all who think like true Germans," one Nazi bard wrote.

In the fifteen years between Wessel's death and the demise of Nazism in Germany, some 250 biographies, novels and plays about Wessel were written. Municipal councils renamed squares and streets in his honour.

Two pimps

The youthful Horst was obsessed with nationalism, which he understood roughly as Konstantin Ostashvili did. This was to "Kill, crush and drive underground." Who? The Jews, the democrats and the Communists. True, Ostashvili discovered what he thought sound forces within the Communist Party, whereas Wessel was more of a pessimist and sought to exterminate all the Reds.

Ostashvili hired a karate coach to train his militants in one or another cellar. Wessel trained his stormtroopers in gyms, as karate was unknown then. Ostashvili, as he himself admitted, would turn up at meetings of democrats with youths who "well know how to use their fists," Wessel's favourite entertainment was a fist fight. Naturally both strutted forth only when opponents were outnumbered.

According to one of Wessel's militants: "Twenty-five of the best stormtroopers ranged themselves up in front of the platform. More stood on the left, by the bar. The remainder stood on the right at the entrance. The Communists were attacked in a pincer movement with fists, beer mugs, and broken chair legs."

After one such "evening," Horst Wessel picked up on Alexanderplatz an 18-year-old whore, Erna Janikke, while quarrelling with her pimp. Wessel, the admiring biographer relates, made short shrift of the youth "A couple of haymakers and then straight to the solar plexis. The punk doubled up with pain."

Erna, who had been working for Ali Hohler before now worked for Horst Wessel who now pimped further.

She even moved into his quarters, which went against the grain of the landlady, Widow Salm, whose late husband had been a Communist. The rows that erupted between Widow Salm and the whore Erna, who later alleged that she shared with Wessel not only bed but also his national socialism, had nothing to do with ideology as they mostly concerned rent and the joint use of the kitchen. Row followed row until on the night of January 14, 1930, Widow Salm took herself off in a rage to the "Bar" pub, were Communists congregated.

A "proletarian thrashing"

They were only too willing to give Sturmfuhrer Wessel a "proletarian thrashing" and evict the whore from widow Salm's decent house. Most likely this would have been no more than another scuffle between Reds and Nazis. However among the avenging crowd was Ali Hohler, Erner's previous pimp deprived of sure takings.

"When Wessel opened the door he understood everything at once," Ali Hohler related in court. "I saw him stretch out his hand to his back pocket and at once realized that he would try to kill me."

Hohler fired first to tell Wessel, who had dropped to the floor: "You well know what this is for."

As Bertolt Brecht wrote later: "Horst Wessel died the death of a professional. Pimp, gunned down by another pimp."

Goebbels cared nothing for that. What he wanted was a martyr to vindicate Nazi terror.

However, our national socialists are finding it rather hard to find a Horst Wessel of their own. When, for instance, one of the ideologues of the "drive against Zionism" was jailed, they thought to make him hero, but it transpired that he had been imprisoned for cutting up his wife.

Some time ago another professional anti-Zionist was run over by a car in very odd circumstances. At first he was touted as a "victim of the international Jewish conspiracy," but this soon died down when some of the leaders of national socialism in this country alleged that he was nothing but a masquerading Jew.

So will Ostashvili do? Not much to write home about, as they say. The assortment is pretty poor, either murderer or alcoholic. Still, Goebbels used a pimp. Where will the national socialists find anything better?

Not to say that would make of national socialism less of a danger. Yet there never were any decent folk among the German Nazis and neither are there any decent folk amidst our national socialists.

Leonid Mlechin

Photos from Moskovsky Komsomolets and Der Spiegel (Germany)



Ali Hohler, the rival pimp

One of the legion of monuments to Wessel in the familiar art trend of national socialist realism

IN SEARCH OF THE FUTURE

Between the cold war and the 21st century

Alexander Yakovlev

Why are the consequences of confrontation in the Asian Pacific region being overcome with so great difficulty? What can Moscow and Tokyo do?

No one can provide as yet a scientific answer to the question of why and by what laws there disappeared from the historical arena the ancient civilizations, leaving to us great material values and inexhaustible sources of spiritual ones. The troubled Middle Ages and the subsequent Reformation and Renaissance were followed by a series of technological breakthroughs, bloody wars, ecological crimes and by man steadily falling out of harmony with nature.

It looks, though, as if an opportunity to turn over a new leaf in world history has presented itself at the end of the 20th century. This "mad, mad world" of ours is waking up and shaking off the bloody nightmares of the past. The trend towards entirely new civilizations – a united Europe, the Soviet Union, Latin America – is manifesting itself ever more clearly.

A region of unique resources

The future of the planet will, nevertheless, be largely determined by Asia, particularly by the part of it which gravitates towards the Pacific, that Mediterranean of the 21st century civilization.

Almost a third of mankind is concentrated in that part of the world, on the islands and continents sharing the Pacific. The contrasts of our time are very much in evidence there. On the one hand, the region has achieved striking successes in the fields of science, industrial production, management and communications; on the other hand, it is grappling with serious problems both inherited from the past and born of industrial civilization.

The nations of that part of the planet have felt a full impact of share of the biggest upheavals of the 19th and 20th centuries which have made the world what it is today. I mean all the major revolutions and civil conflicts from South America to European Russia. Imperialist annexations and anti-colonial resistance. The tsunamis of the two world wars and the tragedies of numerous local wars. A stern warning of what a third world war could do to mankind thundered there for the first time, claiming tens of thousands of lives.

In other words, the peoples of the Asian Pacific have drunk to the dregs the bitter cup of suffering, ordeals and brutalities which have fallen to the lot of the last six-seven generations of people the world over. They have had their share of political, ideological, confes-

Drawing by Igor Shein

Alexander Nikolayevich Yakovlev, Full Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is senior adviser of the President of the USSR

This article is based on the speech he made at the General Assembly of the International Press Institute in Kyoto, Japan

sional and other conflicts which tore the world apart stirring up hatred, prejudices and intolerance.

At the same time, the Asian Pacific region has unique natural and human resources for development, which is more obvious now, at the end of the 20th century, than ever. Practically all kinds of natural resources and a large variety of climatic conditions found there offer prerequisites for economic integration.

The states' and nations' aspirations to progress and to a worthy place in the world is a stimulus to vigorous creative endeavour under which most people in that region are working today. There are many convincing examples of hard work, energy and purposefulness bringing tangible results within historically short periods.

In other words, the region has all the material and spiritual prerequisites for transforming itself and for becoming, in the foreseeable future, one of the vital epicentres of world progress not only in the pragmatic sense, but also as regards the objectives set and the ways of carrying them out.

What is it, then, that interferes with the deepening of this process for the sake of universal good?

Asian water-colour

The obstacles to this process are the same as found elsewhere in the world: the legacy of mutual wariness and mistrust; the consequences of wars and conflicts still waiting to be dealt with. The aftermaths of the Cold War which still make themselves felt. The echo of military-political antagonisms and ideological confrontation. The existence of the groups of interests gravitating, by their nature, to social and interstate violence.

And still, I think, the problem lies not only in eliminating the political and psychological trail left by the Cold War. I could name a number of other factors which objectively complicate the task of getting Asian Pacific cooperation under way but also make it more fruitful and gratifying after the starting process will have prove to be successful.

The most important factor of all is the Asian Pacific region being a place of communication and interaction of great ancient nations and civilizations. These are largely different nations, each with its own achievements and with its own notions, experience, traditions and customs accumulated over the ages.

Up till now the epithet "great" has been applied to a nation and a society possessing a substantial natural potential and strong enough to be self-sufficient and autarchic. This has been, and still is, true of the Asian Pacific region. For quite a while yet the biggest countries of the region will be able to do without close and wide-ranging cooperation among themselves. This will tell upon the rate and quality of their progress and is fraught with quarrels and frictions among them, but they will manage all right.

Another specific feature of the situation in that region is that almost every country there is undergoing serious internal transformations. Although these transformations have much in common, their forms, aims and rates vary. The changes are universal, however, and cause sharp conflicts on the domestic front. This naturally has an effect on their foreign policy: on the extent of their freedom from isolationism, on the governments', parties' and politicians' manoeuvrability.

To my mind, all these factors hinder the progress towards the "Asian Pacific home" and cause it to lose momentum. In the Asian Pacific region the course of history has a logic and a chronology of its own. This ought to be taken into consideration, I am sure.

In Europe, direct confrontation between the mighty armed forces of *the two blocs* made bringing the situation back to normal a vital necessity. When this normalization began, the clearness of bloc and ideological delimitations made it easier to reach compromises. The more so as all this happened in the context of largely common political traditions and habits.

In the Asian Pacific region there are similar points of departure which, however, can be likened to water-colours rather to oil paints: no clear-cut bloc structures are found there, and the spectrum of hues is much richer. At the same time, each of the entities active there possess a high degree of independence and autonomy, a highly developed and distinctive political culture of its own, which is not always and not quite familiar to and understood by others.

Moscow and Tokyo between Scylla and Charybdis

Two roads have led the man to the modern world.

One has been the road of trial and error, of learning by his mistakes, which have often cost him a dear price. The other has been that of using knowledge, intelligence and intuition, of extrapolating his past experience into the future.

The evolution of relations in the Asian Pacific region can proceed along the former road. I do not think that this choice of the road will involve, nowadays, any excessive risks, specifically the risk of military-political confrontation. Nevertheless, the progress by trial and error is bound to be a slow one, with more opportunities lost than found.

Alternatively, this evolution can follow a daring but realistic long-term plan. Putting the cart before the horse, inventing chimeras or building castles in the air won't get anyone anywhere. Already today it is necessary to take every measure so as to maximize prospective gains and to minimize expected losses for the benefit of each and all.

Personally, I regard this long-term formula of relations in the region as more promising than the former one. What's more, this formula is, a priori, open to everything new and rules out in advance the potential sources of frictions, differences and conflicts.

It is in the context of this formula that I'd like to examine Soviet-Japanese relations and the new elements brought into them by the Soviet President's visit.

The visit had to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis: Scylla of the "territorial issue" against the background of the situation currently obtaining in the region and inside the USSR and Japan; and Charybdis of expecting a miracle, a sensation. Myself, I have never regarded either extreme as productive.

Have Soviet-Japanese relations entered an entirely new stage? Before answering this question, let us see what they were like in the past.

The two countries regarded each other as potential enemies for decades.

– The bilateral sphere of relations was not considered to be of vital importance. It was taken for granted that Soviet-Japanese relations had nothing to do with "big politics".

– As a result, the territorial issue took on a self-contained character, turned into the absolute, assumed extremely politicized and ideologized forms. That was a "dialogue of the deaf" which ruled out any possibility of a compromise.

What are the new elements of these relations?

– Circumstantial talks took place at the

summit level for the first time in years.

– The existence of the territorial delimitation issue was recognized and a concrete way to resolve it mapped out.

– The public of both countries has come to realize the complexity of the historical, political and psychological contexts of Soviet-Japanese relations, the territorial issue included. The complexity of the process will call for compromises, for going beyond the habitual limits of the long-fossilized formulae, for stepping up quests for new unorthodox decisions.

– The agreements reached on prisoners-of-war, on the demilitarization of the islands, on the non-visa entry make it possible to put an end to many grudges. Japan has formally declared for an extensive development of relations in many spheres, the trade and economic ones included, parallel with the peace treaty negotiations. And although there are as yet only a few concrete agreements, a new atmosphere of a well-wishing attitude to the promotion of such links is being created.

M.Gorbachev and T.Kaifu: The mention of "hostile states" has lost all sense.

– The problems connected with the USSR's and Japan's *international relations* merit attention. As a matter of fact, we are all set for coordinating our efforts in both regional and global matters.

– One of the major indications of the Cold War in Soviet-Japanese relations having come to end is the recognition that the mention of "hostile states" in the UN Charter has lost all sense. This is an extremely important circumstance for Japan, offering it new opportunities.

– The USSR, or its part, sets great store by Japan's consent to facilitate its entry into the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference. Japan had objected to this for years.

– For the first time in years, Japan has formally declared for a wide-ranging development of relations. The 15 signed documents on cooperation in specific fields lay a new groundwork for relations in a situation where cooperation is in the order of the day. This cooperation will proceed in the atmosphere of ever growing mutual goodwill between the two nations.

At the same time, this is Japan's major step towards becoming a global political power with a weighty say in world affairs, to the overcoming of the gap between its global economic and its global political roles.

Many of these potentialities still remain such, of course. The forces adhering to old approaches will probably offer resistance to the new trends – in both countries, at that.

With the past record of our relations and with the hard domestic situation in the USSR taken into consideration, the Summit accomplished the most of what it had been expected to, and marked a new break-through in world affairs in a very important segment of world politics.

I read in the papers that Japan has declined to make any substantial investments in the Soviet economy. This is true. I am sorry about that, but I think that instability and uncertainty will be overcome step by step. Our invitation is sincere, we are firmly determined to take part in the international division of labour. I should weigh all the consequences of this process for all countries, especially for the neighbouring ones.

Law, not force

There was a time when bilateral relations between states decided everything, while international relations as a whole kind of grew out of them. This level of relations remains to this day and will remain in the future.

At the same time, the system of international relations as a whole has been gaining in independence over the past few years. It has become largely self-contained. Although it cannot but come under the influence of the entire sum total of direct interstate links and conflicts, it already has structures and problems of its own, and has acquired the capacity to make up for the negative and even dangerous developments which occur from time to time in bilateral or regional relations.

The recognition of all human activities throughout the planet are part of the global effort to promote our common civilization is a landmark in modern history. The moral priority of common human values has been recognized. Emphasis has been made on the equal and democratic character of relations among countries and nations, on the need for the law taking precedence over force. The important thing is that these trends are embodied in concrete transformations both in the world system and in the internal renewal of many countries and social systems.

I regard this – from both theoretical and practical angles – as a promise of the further advance towards a world which would guarantee human and national rights, seek changes for the better and natural socio-economic progress, recognize only its peaceful ways and forms, and emphasize not the right of the strong but spiritual self-improvement of individual human beings and mankid as a whole.

Such a new system, intended to give man peace of mind and to harmonize him with nature, is needed by all of us. The 20th century has taught us – or, at any rate, ought to have taught us – how high the cost of missed opportunities is.

It is stupid and suicidal to go on behaving as we have behaved before. It is necessary to use the historical opportunities the fate has endowed us with already now, to keep looking for new ones. There is also an acute need for self-confidence, for a political climate – both inside the country, in every region and the world over – favourable for intellectual and economic risk.

We have started creating all this, I suppose. This is true of the Soviet side, at any rate. At the international level, changes for the rational and for responsibility are obvious. As I see it, the future of the Asian Pacific region will hardly be free of problems, but I am sure it will see a steady political and psychological deliverance from the last vestiges of confrontation, and a growing conformity to ordinary human demands, both spiritual and economic.

A search warrant

Vaclav Havel is suspected of being a Jew. Alexander Dubcek is called a nazi. Leaders of the "tender" revolution are thought to be KGB agents...

Inna Rudenko,
own correspondent

For two days the Czechoslovak television transmitted a live broadcast of the Federal Assembly session which discussed the results of inquiry into possible collaboration of some deputies with the former state security bodies. The names of suspects had been made known. Taking the floor one after another, all ten suspects denied their guilt in the eyes of the public. "The Federal Assembly discussion of the results of the inquiry was a shameful affair for the nation, *Rude Pravo* would write later on, because the guilt of these people was not proved legally. The day on which the session began was called "black Friday" by *Svobodne Slovo.* After all, there is presumption of innocence, the newspaper added. Even Lidove Noviny, known here as a newspaper close to the new government, wrote about the jinn of "lustration" let out of the bottle with good intentions. However, this jinn began to live its own life in the kitchens, on staircase landings and in beerhouses. The last statement refers not only to the process of lustration and Czechoslovakia.

The former head of the pro-fascist regime in Slovakia, Jozef Tiso, who was executed for his war crimes, is again called by some people in Bratislava "the father of the nation"

Bring them to trial?

I recall a meeting held during a "week of conscience" which brought the Memorial society into being. Those who entered the building in which the "week" took place immediately found themselves in the 1930s and 1940s. The eyes of innocent victims gazed at you from the walls. Beside stood a camp wheelbarrow filled with voluntary donations up to the top. Further on stood designs of monuments to the victims of Stalin repressions. I still remember a frame covered with red paint, and a red square.

People quietly entered into a hall and took their seats in silence. On the walls hung enlarged photographs showing crowds of people welcoming Stalin, voting for death sentences on "enemies of the state," again welcoming and again voting unanimously. It was the barbaric conformism which we are trying to get rid of now.

Those who survived by a miracle came up to the microphone one after another. Suddenly a young man rushed to the speaker, tore the microphone away from his hands and shouted: "They must be brought to trial. A series of political trials of former interrogators must be organised without delay. Let us vote." Those present instantly raised their hands without hesitation. The speaker – a grey-haired emaciated man who underwent trials in nazi and then Soviet camps – bitterly exclaimed: "Again? You again want to plunge the country into an abyss of political trials. New mistakes are possible, documents have been lost or falsified. It is an oversimplification to divide people into clean and unclean and, without thinking for a moment, again to raise hands for voting. What then is the difference between us and those people?" And the elderly man pointed to the enlarged photographs on the wall.

"Are we returning to the political trials of the 1950s?" asked Alexander Dubcek, a man who himself was persecuted.

While reading the reminiscences of peope who were subjected to repressions one can notice that their desire to describe how it was is rarely or almost never accompanied by anathemas against their tormentors. The desire for purification does not call for vengeance. And it is not a matter of usual mercy here. Those who went through the inferno know well that the road to it is often paved

with good intentions. So it is dangerous to let the jinn out.

Enthusiasm over dictatorship

"I am still amazed at the mystery of our enthusiasm over dictatorship. We were not wicked people, and we did not look for easy life and advantages." It is a precious admission of Pyotr Grigorenko, a noted human rights champion. For many of those who did not even smell camp dust everything is clear and understandable: the wicked and dishonest oppressed the kind and honest, and all the people trembled with fear. How can one be enthusiastic over dictatorship? However, for Grigorenko, who underwent a terrible ordeal in prisons and mental homes, this remained a puzzle even when he was already an old man. It is much more difficult to unravel this mystery than put one, two or ten persons in the pillory. Therefore, for genuine purification it is much more important to understand and study the sincere "enthusiasm over dictatorship" than hold some people to shame. We shall purify ourselves only when the admission of everyone's guilt will be understood not simply as a Christian postulate but as a condemnation of the system.

However, we often view the past and personalities out of the historical context, from the vantage-point of present-day knowledge and possibilities which we have acquired rather by learning than by our own meditation. In this case everyone who took part in the October 1917 revolution can easily be accused of villainy. The "1960s intellectuals" can be reproached with the false belief in socialism with a human face. And so we can go down to Plato, for he was an idealist.

Some time ago our school, guided by "the most advanced world outlook," instilled in us the idea of our historical superiority backed up by high authorities, from the revolutionary democrats of Russia to Lenin. Confident of this superiority and being "narrow-minded historically," we arrogantly accused Tolstoy, Chekhov, Dostoyevsky and many others of various sins.

Today we are issuing such a historical search warrant to ourselves. In this way we often brush aside the people who in one way or another reflected the epoch so hateful to us now. Stalin called Mayakovsky "the best and most talented poet" of the epoch. It does not mean, however, that he was a feeble poet. It will be recalled that not only the "father of all nations", but also Akhmatova and Tsvetayeva recognized him as a great poet.

A crowd of nationalist-minded Slovaks did not even want to listen to President Havel

Nikolai Ostrovsky was idolized and his biography was changed to tally with that of the main character of his novel. Does it mean that he should be removed from literature. Once I attended a public debate with some participants in it claiming it was not Nikolai Ostrovsky who wrote *How the Steel was Tempered*. The claim was made after a brilliant study of the novel and its author's life by Lev Annensky, who can hardly be suspected of fawning upon the powers that be. How could such an allegation be made after the following statement of Meyerhold: "I had a one-day conversation with Leo Tolstoy, talked with Anton Chekhov for many hours. Nikolai Ostrovsky comes third in my opinion. Such an unusual culture, an unusual penetration into the truth of life, such an ability to understand what art means." Shall we erase all this from our memory as we previously erased the fact that there were priests among Ostrovsky's forefathers?

Fucik's bust removed

I do not propose artificially to restore the extinct psychological type. I understand that a revision of the image of one or another historic personality or simply burying him in oblivion is a reaction to the myths which had been created around him. But let us not splash a child together with water out of a bath-tub. Let us pass from emotions to precise research which will assign everyone the place he or she deserves.

A commission of specialists has been formed in Czechoslovakia to study everything connected with the name of Julius Fucik. It has already proved that his *Notes from the Gallows* was edited by some top leader before its publication. The passages conveying Fucik's purely human feelings were deleted from the book because, in the opinion of the leader, they detracted from the image of the legendary hero. It has been proved at the same time that, contrary to rumours, the book was written by Fucik himself.

But, unfortunately, the rumours appeared before the commission drew its conclusions. A monument to Julius Fucik was pulled down, and the bust from the niche of the house in which he lived was taken to a store. Many personalities from the recent history of our countries were made a legend. But getting rid of the legend, tearing stereotype masks from them, we can eliminate their real images.

Recently public attention has been drawn to Slovakia, where movements and organizations of every kind call for declaring it a sovereign republic. They demand that an economic reform take fuller account of the specific features of the republic, in which the former deformations were felt more tangibly than anywhere else. It is not accidental that Slovakia has higher unemployment than the Czech lands, though its population is smaller. The desire of people to know their history better is quite natural. Some time ago a rally was held in Bratislava's central square to mark the anniversary of the independent Slovak state. It seemed, however, that those gathered did not care about one thing, namely, that it was a protectorate of nazi Germany. The sponsors of the rally broadcast a speech by Tiso, the head of the protectorate, who was executed as a war criminal. One of the

posters said, "Down with Jews." Someone cried, addressing President Havel, "You Jew.".

One of the Prague newspapers reproached Dubcek with, believe it or not, national-socialism. It assailed him, a former Communist, for his former adherence to socialism, including socialism of the "spring 1968" fashion. No one recalled that Czechoslovakia had the world's largest number of Communists per 1.000 population, that in 1968 three fourths of its population unreservedly backed the Communist Party, that people who had previously shouted, "Better dead than red" began to chant "Dubcek! Freedom!".

It is only today, from the vantage-point of the past years and experience that we understand – though not yet fully, in my opinion – why the brilliant experiment failed. We are all wise after the event.

Let us not frighten ourselves by the size of consequences of such an approach to history, for we should understand that the pendulum always swings from one extreme position to another before it stops. Let us take history as such, and not as our present situation which is changeable and can be influenced by us. I am talking not about oblivion and forgiveness, but about the need for chastity. For the lessons we draw from the past should also have a moral value. Otherwise, there can be no talk of purification.

What lessons can be drawn by young people from the barbarous destruction of monuments in our and other former socialist countries? Of course, one should not regret the pulling down of numerous stereotype monuments erected throughout the country. However, caution must be displayed in this case.

Slovaks were discontented with the resignation of their premier Vladimir Meciar, who was accused of upholding the republic's sovereignty

Shortly before Victory Day the famous Soviet tank put up in the Smichov district of Prague as a monument was painted pink and "decorated" with the picture of an index finger or something worse. The author of such an "original" idea added his name to the names of Soviet soldiers buried here. The monument was certainly restored, because not only Soviet people but also the residents of Prague became indignant at the hooligan action. The young man who did that and his friends did not evidently realize that it was a desecretation of the memory. The morals of these young people seem to be low if they did not understand the meannes of their action.

Money for Lenin

Incidentally, I am also surprised at the behaviour of some elderly people. Once I gazed at the face of a woman standing at a rally with a poster which said, "Hands off Lenin". She had a usual, kind face, evidently someone's mother or grandmother. Like most of us, she is not familiar with Lenin's teachings. She defended not Lenin, but his icon. One of the Soviet newspapers reported not long ago that an old woman had joined the Communist Party and sent a considerable sum from her modest salary to the Lenin Museum fund. An awful row was raised over the Lenin Museum with a fervour worthy of a better cause as if the Lenin museums have ever been in a sorry plight compared with others.

Treating history in a cavalier manner, we instil a cynic attitude in young people and resistance to changes in the old. The grandmothers and grandfathers remember how brother killed his brother in a fratricidal war. Inertness is shown not only by those who do not want to "abandon their principles." It is half-trouble. It is worse that inertness is also shown by people whose conscience is not altogether dead and this is a real trouble. Reflecting on how hastily people often treat history, the noted publicist and head of the Czech government Petr Pithart writes in his book History and Politics: "The lacking monuments become a sign of a severe and at times truly destructive treatment. And it is not at all successful, because it is known in medicine that a patient sometimes feels a pain in his amputated leg". This pain often makes impossible a truly necessary treatment. A new expression – "tender counter-revolution" – has appeared here as an antipode to the "tender revolution". It is not, however, a matter of expressions. It is a matter of the dangerous deformation of the social psychology of people. And today this cannot be explained by history only.

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After the kisses in Baghdad

Will Operation Haven save the Kurdish refugees?

Alexander Chudodeyev of *New Times* has interviewed **Dr. Mahmud OSMAN,** member of the Front of Iraqi Kurdistan, who has recently visited Moscow.

New Times. How did the situation in Northern Iraq change after the coalition troops were deployed there?

Mahmud Osman. After Saddam Hussein once again unleashed a war of genocide against the Kurds, the world community decided to react to the crimes of the Baghdad dictator. Today we absolutely need humanitarian aid: starvation, exposure and desease are killing as many as 100 a day. Infant mortality rate is ten times higher than before the war. There is a real threat of cholera, an epidemic of which would be a disaster.

However, we are receiving alarming news that the United Nations has almost run out of resourses to render aid to the Kurdish refugees. UN representatives say that the international community has been slow in responding to the UN call to set up a relief fund for the Iraqi refugees.

After Operation Desert Storm the Americans are mounting Operation Haven. A tent camp for the refugees is being hastily constructed on the outskirts of the Iraqi town of Zakhu where the US Marines' HQ is located. Another refugee camp – Bajir – is being set up on a vast plain east of Zakhu. To set up each of the 200 tents takes four US marines only fifteen minutes. That is why the "safe haven" for Kurdish refugees is rapidly growing – today it is 120 kilometres long and about 60 kilometres wide. There are no Iraqi troops in the security area, they have withdrawn from there on the Americans' demand. Said Gen. Jay Garner, the Commander of the US Force in Northern Iraq: "The Iraqis do what we want." This is true.

Nonetheless, the Kurdish refugees are afraid to return home. So far only several thousands out of the two million refugees have returned – mostly old people. We fear that the Kurdish refugees in Turkey may stay there for a long time and their settlments there will turn to something resembling the camps of Palestinian refugees. People understand that the Americans will not stay in Northern Iraq for ever. That is why the refugees fear that after the US troops have withdrawn, the Saddam Hussein army will return to unleash horrible reprisals. Logically, the priority now is international guarantees of security of Kurdish refugees.

Kurdish children continue to die

Photo from the newspaper Anatolian (Turkey)

N.T. Who do you think must offer such guarantees?

M.O. The tragedy of our people is not unique. The destinies of Palestinians, Cambodians, Afghans are very similar to the destiny of the Kurdish people. The world community has an experience in solving such problems, although that experience cannot be described as especially successful. However, in one way or another the world is trying to put out the conflagrations in those conflict zones. As for the Kurds, the world seems to have forgotten about them. Meanwhile, the Kurdish problem is not new and many countries have taken efforts to aggravate and complicate it.

During their centuries-long history Kurds have always been subject to suppression on the part of stronger neighbours. In the modern epoch Turkey, Iraq and Iran resolutely resisted the very idea of an independent Kurdish state, while the Western powers did not see any reasons to help the Kurds become independent.

Perhaps it is time when the world ought to get involved in solving the Kurdish problem. The more so as unlike the Palestinians who are fighting for their own state, the Kurds do not demand an independent Kurdistan, but a broader autonomy within integral Iraq. An autonomy that would guarantee the rights and freedoms of the Kurdish people.

N.T. However, the Kurds cannot seriously count on the coalition forces to set up the desired autonomy. Besides, the security zone is so small that it is unrealistic to speak about settling all Kurdish refugees there. A paradox appears. If Kurds do not return to their native land, it will be inevitably populated by Arabs. Consequently, there is no way for Kurds to avoid entering a deal with Saddam Hussein. Obviously, Saddam is not a trustworthy partner. Perhaps, the British plan of solution should be adopted?

M.O. We have started negotiating with Saddam Hussein, despite that these negotiations astonished, and even angered, the world community. The Western media asked questions: what was behind the Baghdad meeting of irreconcilable adversaries and how could Kurdish leaders exchange kisses with their archenemy? I must make it clear that we have never had any illusions about Saddam Hussein. Probably, we should not have kissed, although kissing is a traditional gesture of our people, meaning nothing more than a form of greeting. But the matter is that we believe that in the current situation, which is tragic for our people, we must be

guided by reason, not emotions. The Kurdish people has to be urgently saved. The Kurds need a break, not an unequal war. The Front of Iraqi Kurdistan wants Saddam Hussein to grant an autonomy to the Kurds and to agree to democratic reforms in the country.

The first round of talks in Baghdad has been successful. We have reached an agreement in principle with Saddam. The Baghdad ruler promised to hold free elections in the country during the next six months and to abolish the Revolutionary Command Council. He also agreed to include the city of Kirkuk – the oil capital of Northern Iraq – into Iraqi Kurdistan. Besides, Hussein sanctioned the release of all Kurds convicted on political charges. Naturally, we are far from euphoric. The Front leadership realize that only international guarantees can secure a long-term character of these agreements and prevent Saddam from violating them.

Now a few words about the proposal voiced by the British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, at the recent meeting of EC Foreign Ministers. The objective of his plan is to replace the American, British, French and Dutch troops currently guarding the refugees with a UN police contingent. This idea is positive. One of the advantages of the British plan is that the UN does not need to pass another resolution of the Security Council. Legally, the decision to deploy a UN police force in Northern Iraq can be based on UN Security Council Resolution 688, which sanctions the United Nations to carry out humanitarian actions in Iraq. However, the implementation of the London plan will, in our opinion, be only the first step to the solution of the Kurdish problem. On the whole, we would like the world community to play a greater role than just policing Iraq. The Front of Iraqi Kurdistan hopes that UN representatives will take part in our negotiations with Baghdad. Moreover, we want such representatives not only to participate as observers and witnesses, but also to act as arbiters in solving disputable issues. Besides, we are taking efforts to include the Kurdish question in the agenda of the next international conference on the Middle East alongside the Palestinian problem.

N.T. What was the aim of your visit to Moscow?

M.O. The aim was to convey the entire package of our considerations and proposals to Soviet leaders. Here in Moscow I met Yevgeny Primakov of the USSR Security Council and spoke with ranking foreign ministry officials...

N.T. Did you also embrace and kiss Primakov when you met him?

M.O. No. After the kisses in Baghdad we are scared with the international reaction to those kisses and try to avoid our traditional forms of greetings for the time being, although I have known and respected Mr. Primakov for a long time and there is nothing wrong in my kissing and embracing him. Mr. Primakov is an excellent interlocutor and a great expert in Kurdish matters. This is the positive aspect of our meeting. The negative aspect is that the meeting produced little, if any, results, especially if one takes into account the magnitude of the tragedy in Northern Iraq. I cannot understand your country's policy in the region, in particular, your stance on the Kurdish issue. You used to ignore the problem. In this respect, my meeting with Mr. Primakov was a breakthrough, of course. Now that the whole world has remembered the Kurds and decided to help us, the Soviet Union pretends the problem does not concern it. This behaviour seems strange at least, considering the fact that despite the internal crisis, the Soviet Union remains a great power, notwithstanding the fact that after the Gulf war the Soviet influence in the region has weakened.

N.T. Several days ago Saddam Hussein's 54th anniversary was pompously celebrated in Tikrit, the native town of the "wise ruler," and the day itself was dubbed "the birthday of a new Iraq." The Iraqi leader wanted to impress the West with that celebration, he wanted to demonstrate that he and his Baath Party were fully in control in Iraq. Is that really so?

M.O. I believe it is not completely so. If Saddam were as strong as Baghdad claims he is, he would have cracked down on the Kurds, not negotiated with them. As for the farce with Saddam's birthday party, it is yet another characteristic trait of the man. The country is ruined and the "wise ruler" speaks about a new birth. All this brings to mind the well-known episode with Marie Antoinette, wife of the French king, Louis XVI: when hungry mobs assembled outside the palace to demand bread, the queen said "Let them eat cakes". Like the French royals, Saddam Hussein has lost the feeling of shame and touch with reality. I believe that the end of Saddam Hussein will be as ignominious as that of the French royal couple.

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Some border issues unsolved

The Soviet-Chinese border issues have been pushed into the background, but they have not disappeared

The present Soviet-Chinese border passes along natural boundaries. It was demarcated in a treaty concluded many decades ago. At the initial stage of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China their leaders did not admit the existence of territorial disputes between the two countries, and the validity of the Soviet-Chinese frontier was not questioned.

In fact, the situation was not at all as bright, as it could appear from official statements. However, the ideological affinity of the ruling parties allowed the two countries to ignore the intricacies of the border issue. Moscow and Beijing were concerned more about the hostile encirclement, the cold war and military tension. Beijing was also worried over the potential threat of invasion by the Chiang Kai-shek army, aggression on the part of the United States, economic blockade and political isolation of the country.

At the seventh congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1945 Mao Zedong noted with good reason that the Soviet Union was the first to have annulled inequitable treaties and concluded "new equitable treaties" with China. He also made this point during his visit to Moscow on Decemberr 16, 1949.

In accord with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded between the two countries in 1950 the population of the border areas maintained active ties and brisk trade and established cultural exchange. Among the numerous agreements concluded by that time on various aspects of bilateral relations there were agreements on border cooperation in a number of spheres, including navigation along the border rivers and forestry in border areas.

Nevertheless, violations of these agreements began already in the period between 1956 and 1959. At first, the border authorities successfully resolved problems without interference from Moscow and Beijing. The Soviet Union proposed concluding a treaty on the border regime and mutual assistance in the settling of border issues. Unfortunately, the proposal was not accepted by China.

The ideological polemic between the Communist parties of the two cuntries resulted in the growth of interstate disputes. The strategic confrontation between Moscow and Beijing gradually assumed a global character, and under Leonid Brezhnev it led to an armed conflict. One of the reasons of the conflict was the failure of the border talks in 1964 as well as Mao's statements which had been understood by Moscow as a claim to 1.5 million square kilometres of Soviet territory.

It should be noted, however, that for all its controversial nature the Chinese government's statement of October 8, 1969, pointed out specially that Beijing "does not demand a return of the territories seized by tsarist Russia with the help of these (Russian-Chinese – **A.V.**) treaties." (Similar formulations were also contained in the PRC's statements of May 24 and June 7, 1969). However, in conditions of the aggravating conflict the Chinese scientific and newspaper articles on the border issue and the history of Chinese-Russian relations were interpreted by Moscow as a "substantiation" of Chinese territorial claims.

The stand taken by the Soviet leadership brought about appropriate publications by Chinese historians. They began to prove that Moscow's foreign policy was "a continuation of the aggressive policy of Russian tsars." Soviet periodicals alleged on their part that Beijing "continues the expansionist strategy of the Chinese emperors," "lays claim to a part of the Soviet territory," and so on.

During the years of the ideological controversy the two parties devised their own scientific concepts proving the sovereign right of each of the states to the "disputed territories." Paradoxically enough, these concepts seem as plausibe to us and as their own are to our Chinese neighbours. True, it should be admitted that from the standpoint of methodology the Chinese concepts regarding the unjust decisions on the border issue in the past have every right to existence because they are backed up by certain "experience" (in the philosophical sense), that is, by real facts. It is still very difficult for us to realize this fact.

It is futile to try to solve these problems by adopting the stand of one of the parties and, the more so, by force of arms. Incidentally, such a conclusion can be drawn from armed clashes in the area of the Damansky island and the town of Zhalanashkol, in the Semipalatinsk region. Nevertheless, it took some time for Moscow and Beijing to understand that differences must not rule out talks because agreement can be reached only in this way.

Soviet-Chinese border talks resumed only in 1987. They reflected new tendencies in interstate relations. During the first round both parties decided to examine the demarcation of the entire Soviet-Chinese frontier. They agreed that in view of the existing agreements on the present border between the USSR and China it would be rational to apply the principle of demarcation along the fairway on navigable rivers and along the middle of a river or its main branch on non-navigable ones.

The parties also agreed that, while talks between their delegations continued, they would form a group of experts to examine the concrete questions of demarcation on the eastern sector of the Soviet-Chinese frontier. It was stated by them later on that the settlement of border issues, the turning of the Soviet-Chinese frontier into a zone of friendship and good-neighbourliness would be a factor vital for the two countries and for peace and stability in Asia and worldwide.

A change in the policy of the two coun-

Today the border along the Amur River is no longer a hindrance to cultural and trade ties between the neigbouring cities of Blagoveshchensk and Heihe

TASS photo

tries and in their approach to each other provided favourable conditions for a summit meeting held in Beijing in mid-May 1989. The joint communiqué on the results of the meeting laid a political foundation for Soviet-Chinese relations. They are now based on the clear realization of a relationship between the national state interests, on the universal principles of interstate relations.

The two parties agreed to reduce their armed forces in the border area to the minimum and declared in favour of settling the border disputes between them justly and rationally, in accordance with the agreements on the present Soviet-Chinese border and generally accepted standards of international law, in the spirit of consultations, mutual understanding and concessions.

A joint group of military and diplomatic experts was formed for substantive talks on the question concerned.

Tangible results have been achieved at the border talks over the last two years. By the end of 1990 agreement seems to have been reached on nearly nine tenths of the Soviet-Chinese frontier, which stretches for about 7,500 km.

Confidence measures have also been strengthened in the military field. At the end of 1989 Moscow and Beijing started negotiations on a mutual reduction of their armed forces in the border area. During Premier Li Peng's visit to the Soviet Union in April 1990 the foreign ministers of the two countries signed a special inter-governmental agreement on guiding principles of a mutual reduction of armed forces and the strengthening of confidence in the military field in the area of the Soviet-Chinese border.

Moscow has also taken a number of important unilateral measures. It declared in January 1990 that the Soviet armed forces would be reduced by 120,000 men in the Far East and that 16 warships would be withdrawn from the Pacific Fleet. The aircraft based in the region would be reduced, too. A structural reform of the armed forces deployed along the Soviet-Chinese border has been started to impart a purely defensive character to them. A complete demilitarization of the frontier is envisaged in the future.

The recent past goes to show that the dispute about the historical ownership of one or another territory is futile in interstate relations. Arguments concerning historical ownership are not convincing. Today border issues should be resolved by political means. However, there are subjective factors, such as inertness, stereotype thinking, dogmatism and public opinion, which still considerably influence the choice of positions. It is clear, nevertheless, that decisions are unavoidable if the parties want to build normal, good-neighbourly relations.

Experience shows that border relations between countries must be determined only by foreign policy documents. They cannot depend on the character of relations between states at a given moment. Any arguments based on the imperfection of treaties concluded in the past are impermissible here. In the strategic respect, the security of frontiers should be ensured not by armed force but by the interest of countries in the mutually advantageous division of labour and economic ties.

What can be expected in the near future? Are Moscow and Beijing able now to solve the border issue unambiguously? Probably, they are not. It is very easy to undermine confidence and very hard to restore it.

This means that a compromise should be expected. The parties will state what questions they can decide today. The questions which they are not prepared to decide now will be left for the coming generations. Thus, we can apparently expect the signing of a border agreement which will record what has already been settled and leave the unsettled issues for the future. A final decision will be postponed.

It should be remembered here that every compromise has positive and negative aspects. A compromise brings us nearer to our goal but creates a dangerous conviction in the achievement of results which may turn illusory under other political conditions. That is why the conclusion of a border treaty finally resolving all the issues left over from the past can be the only and really important goal which both parties should try to attain.

Alexei Voskresensky

Dollars are not wanted

Monetary policy changes national psychology

An incredible thing has happened, something one would dismiss as absurd about two years ago. Even taxi-drivers, who once tried to get dollars and other hard currency from foreigners, no longer want them today, preferring zlotys instead. Foreign currency is not accepted either in shops. And this in a country which cultivated for decades not only a double-currency sistem of trade, but also a double value orientation with the dollar being the supreme ruler. Such an atmosphere also cultivated double morals, because Poles came to realize already in their childhood that hard currency is a symbol of prosperity while the national currency is rather a sign of poverty and endless queues.

Glittering currency stores, hotels and bars, on one pole, and dingy and half-empty shops and flea markets, on the other, seemed to have kept up the two-dimensional morals, distorted the psychology of citizens and engendered mass apathy. The same can be said about the desire of Poles to go to the West, if not for good then just to make a fortune by working as a waiter, loader or stripteaser, that is, at the cost of humiliation, forgetting about their diplomas and high qualification.

The effect of an open border

The above said applies to other countries which have got lost on the road of the "socialist choice". The hunting after hard currency, black marketing and mass emigration are also familiar to us.

Within one and a half year the consciousness and behavior of people in the new situation have changed rapidly in Poland. Early in April most European states allowed Poles to travel without visas. It was expected that masses of people would rush to the western border. Preparations for an exodus were made on both sides of the border by frontier guards, customs officials and merchants. But, as in the case of currency, a no less surprising thing happened. The control points on the Polish-German border registered practically no growth in traffic.

The border and customs formalities now take three to five hours (compared with two-three days on the Soviet-Polish border in Brest). Nevertheless, only 50,000 Poles have crossed the border with Germany till now, considerably less than expected. Airlines, international bus lines and railways did not register a substantial growth in traffic to the West either. Such is the effect of an open border when at least relative welfare is achieved at home. The reason is simple and evident.

After a change of government Poland achieved a great deal as a result of an uncompromising reform known as the Balcerowicz plan or shock therapy. (See NT 12/90.) Since 1989, for 14 months now, the exchange value of the zloty in relation to the dollar has been maintained at the level set by the government. This means a rather cheap import, saturation of the market with various goods and products, ranging from tropical fruit to Japanese and South Korean electronic ware, from Turkish leather articles to Chinese clothes and porcelain. It also means an inevitable boosting of export, for the country should earn hard currency.

A debtor becomes a creditor

Thanks to its stabilization and convertibility (though internal so far) the zloty has earned respect it has never enjoyed. In the past, various epithets were applied to the poor zloty. Poles called it straw, paper whithout value and rubbish. The results of monetary operations conducted by Balcerowicz at a government level are quite tangible. By the beginning of 1991 Poland's export exceeded its import by 4.1 billion dollars.

The situation is not so cheerful within the country. And this is natural too, for there is no easy way of going over from one system of economic management to an entirely new one. Though hyperinflation has been checked, inflation remains somewhat higher than the planned figure. It was 13 percent in January, 6.7 percent in February, and 4.5 percent in March. The average incomes, mainly wages, are impeded by taxes and do not rise quicker than prices. As a result, they do not create, as they did before, constant and increasing pressure on the market. That is why the emission of money is needless.

Private enterprise, especially in trade, mediation and the service sphere, is growing rapidly. However, the number of enterprises in the manufacturing industry is dwindling, because it becomes more advantageous to import than to produce. This process has affected agriculture perhaps most of all. Peasants' protests break out more and more often. Poles are witnessing scenes familiar to them from Western media reports. Peasants heap up offices in the agriculture ministry with packs of butter or pour out milk on highways. The pig stock is to exceed 22,000 million this year. Such a growth has not been recorded in the recent history of the country. It has become possible thanks to cheap and plentiful fodder, mainly the abundance of grain and potatoes.

Polish individual peasants could deliver surpluses to their Soviet neighbours. However, the mutually advantageous deal is hampered by the inability to find a trade partner in our chaotic economy. In the meantime, they demand that the government create reliable customs barriers enhance profitability, lower production costs, and strengthen the competitive power. However, it is also afraid of upsetting the present import-export situation.

Polish agriculture has always been private small-scale commodity production. It withstood the threat of forcible collectivization in the late 1940s. However, industry, nationalized at that time, still remains in the hands of state. Privatization and demonopolization are proceeding slowly and painfully. While the situation in the private sector is favourable on the whole there are not yet signs of a radical change in the state-owned sector. A slump in gross output almost by a third and 1.3 million unemployed are alarming indicators.

Cheap import and costly export maintained thanks to the govenment-set ex-

change rate of the dollar can turn Poland into a market for goods the volume of which is rapidly growing. However, it will not manufacture its own goods. Such a danger already exists.

The zloty gains weight

Let us return to the monetary policy, that is, to the stable rate of the internally convertible money, the restoration of its prestige which seemed to have been lost for ever. This is important to stress, because, apart from state importance, this problem has also a human dimension. The fact that every Pole can now buy almost everything on his earninings, even if theoretically, changes the human psychology.

A reservation should be made here, however. The average wage in Poland is in the neighbourhood of 200 dollars a month. One kilo of beef costs one to one and a half dollar and one kilo of half-smoked sausage, three dollars. So let's the reader make arithmetic calculations himself. In short, the transformation of money from mere scraps of paper not supported by goods into a universal commodity equivalent open to the world (one can buy any currency for zlotys in Poland) is changing the social behavior of people. Man becomes not only more confident of the value of his labour. A producer, any worker gets a real stimulus to do more and better, and the combination of such efforts open the way to national prosperity.

Who, following Balcerowicz with his monetary policy, helped to save the internal situation during a radical transition to a market economy? It was a distastefully familiar situation – a chronic deficit, endless queues, profiteering, and the black market. The situation was saved by small producers, handicraftsmen, farmers and petty traders. In the Soviet Union the same role could be played by cooperators, black market dealers, individual peasants and speculators or, in economic parlance, by entrepreneurs. It is generally believed in the Soviet Union that businessmen are engaged in shady affairs. The road to private enterprise was not opened in the USSR four or five years ago, when it was the very time to do that. It has not yet been opened now, and there are no signs that it will be opened in the near future.

There is one more aspect of the monetary policy which, as Polish experience shows, can exert influence on mass psychology. The Soviet people live modestly and have not seen much of the world. For this reason most of them are trustful and at times naive. It does not occur to them that, calling at foreign currency (former Beriozka) shops, they see in the abundance of imported goods and food there not a reflection of the "other" world, but a financial bluff. It does not occur to them that prices in these new "state Beriozka" shops are two, three or even four times higher than in Germany, Spain, Portugal or even Poland, that the monopoly against which we apparently began to fight, continues to dominate here.

No wonder that foreigners working in the Soviet Union try to spend their currency in Berlin, Vienna or other capitals but not in Moscow. Poles made attempts to open shops in Moscow where prices would be a third or half of those in Beriozka shops. But the barriers put up by Soviet "higher authorities" prove insurmountable.

The reasoning is not clear. It appears that the poorer the country is and the less foreign currency it has, the higher the prices of goods in it are. In an attempt to impel foreigners and its citizens to spend hard currency in Beriozka-type shops the Polish government set lower prices in them. For instance, the prices of foreign goods were noticeably lower and the prices of Polish goods much lower than in the West. Therefore, the Poles who earned hard currency abroad "gave" it to the treasury. At present, goods in Beriozka-type shops are sold for zlotys only, with their variety remaining the same.

It is one more step towards enhancing the rating of the zloty, and almost worthless currency only recently. It is vivid proof of the rule long known in the world – the road to an improvement of the nation's finances does not lie through primitive mercantilism which persistently seeks, even to its own detriment, to earn a ruble of profit for a copeck spent.

Though it lays a heavy burden on the ordinary people, the government programme of financial and economic reforms in Poland is marked by its conceptuality, resoluteness and consistency. The people can clearly see the prospects opened by it.

An operation without anaesthesia.
Drawing from the magazine Spotkanya (Poland)

Rudolf Borecki
NT correspondent

WARSAW

Cellophane idyll

Why the workers of a chemical giant do not go on strike

"Unsere Fabrik" says a huge sign on the facade of a leading German concern's headquarters. The concern, one of the world's 30 biggest monopolies (the BASF employs a workforce of 134,834, and 50,000 of them outside Germany) has indeed come to be co-owned by the employers and the employed.

An equilateral triangle

"We have achieved a harmony of interests of the state, the employers and the employed," says Dr. Klaus Cantzler, 59, a member of the chemical concern's board and chief of East Europe department. "We have created an equilateral triangle. Strikes? You are still living in a world of illusions," Dr. Cantzler's response to my question was. "Strikes are a phenomenon abnormal for a healthy society. The employed do have a bone to pick with the administration from time to time, of course, but we handle all the issues amicably, in the spirit of mutual understanding. How can it be otherwise, with all of us being identical sides of the same triangle?"

I wondered what the employed thought about the "equilateral triangle." In the local trade union office I met two workers' leaders – Gunter Klein and Lothar Hieck. The trade union is open to representatives of all political parties, Communists included. There is one exception, though: it does not accept the adherents of the extreme-Right Republican party because they "violate the basic provisions of the FRG Constitution," Lothar Hieck explained. Traditionally, the BASF's trade union is under the influence of the Social-Democrats, its membership accounting for 74 percent of the blue-collar and 34 percent of the white-collar workers. The workers' council has a membership of 59, 32 of them full-time trade union activists. Five representatives of factory and office workers sit on the concern's 15–member supervisory council.

"Strikes?" Gunter Klein repeated my question. "We know about them only from our history textbooks. In 1924, the workers called a lockout, and the last insignificant industrial unrest occured in 1973... Now we settle all the issues with the administration through negotiations."

Trade union activists are confident that there will be no distinction between factory and office workers within two or three years. Trade union dues constitute one percent of their pay. "Members of the trade union are supposed to contribute, in the form of dues, a certain percentage of their bonuses to the trade union fund as well, but they do not do that," Gunter Klein complained. "They cheat the trade union."

"The analiners, as the BASF workers have been calling themselves for more than a century," Lothar Hieck chimed in, "are paid the highest wages in the German chemical industry. Three-quarters of the new value produced go into wages. In the course of a workday, an 'aniliner' puts in 19 minutes per hour for his current needs; 2 minutes for the pension fund; 7 minutes for the social insurance fund; 17 minutes to work off taxes; and 15 minutes for profit. No one quits – what more can one ask for? Besides, it is rather difficult to find a job in Ludwigshafen: there are more unemployed in that city than elsewhere in the FRG. More than a half of the workers have been with the BASF for 15 years, and nearly a quarter, for over 25 years.

Three out of four marks are wages

Trade union activists showed me tariff rates. The blue– and white-collar workers are divided into 13 wage brackets ranging from 1,973 to 5,264 marks. Each BASF employee knows his "pay ceiling" right from the start. Therefore, there is no need to quarrel with the boss or to curry favour with him. Each "aniliner" falls into the category his education and training qualifies him for. Within two years of signing a contract you get entitled to a pay raise – provided, of course, you've proved to be up to the mark. This is followed by another pay raise two years later, and by the last one for the given group in two more years. Finally you reach the limit for your professional rating. You can either resign yourself to this limit until your retirement age, or you can study and improve your qualification in order to make your way to a higher category.

Let us do some arithmetics now. A college graduate who is still to make the grade professionally is paid a monthly salary of 3,040 marks. An average of 23 percent of this sum is taken up by various taxes: state, social insurance, pension... The remainder is about 2,340, minus rent. The concern started building homes for its employees practically at the time of its establishment in 1865. Over 10,000 well-appointed homes have been built in the workers' settlements (eighty percent of the working people live within a radius of 20 km from the enterprise). The number of rooms per family is determined by a simple formula: H + 1 (i.e. one room per each member of the family plus one common living room). Most of the "aniliners" live in concern built homes, the rent ranging from 400 to 800 marks a month, which is much less than the rent charged by private landlords and municipal authorities. Having paid a rent of 600 marks, a person in the 3,040-marks salary bracket keeps 1,740 marks. At the end of the year he receives a guaranteed 13th salary. If the company is doing well, he may well get the 14th one ... If your team has emerged victorious from an "efficiency contest" (not to be mixed up with our "socialist competition") you are paid some more on top of that. If your team has had no setbacks during the year, it is given 20 points. Each setback costs it 5 points meaning that it will receive less gifts. Four setbacks deprive it of bonus. The bonus fund which buys gifts of the contest winners' choice constitutes 3.5 million marks a year. Which means that "front-rankers of production" stand a chance of earning an extra 200 marks apiece by the end of the year.

"Our incomes do not stop at that," Lothar Hieck said. "Eighty to ninety percent of us hold BASF shares, i.e. are co-owners of the chemical industry giant. The concern's blue- and white-collar workers spend their 13th or 14th wage on shares, as a rule. Each share costs a BASF employee 50 marks. At the stock exchange the price of one share ran as high as 298 marks early this year. Annual profit constitutes about 13 marks per share. All the shareholders are equal before the law. One share entitles its holder to one vote at a general meeting of share-holders.

Pensions, vouchers

The BASF employees work 39 hours a week as against 40 hours a week put in by their colleagues elsewhere in Germany, on

the average. They are entitled to a paid leave of 30 to 36 workdays (minus Saturdays and Sundays). The leave pay is calculated on the basis of the average annual wage on top of which the enterprise pays out a bonus of 35 marks per each day of the leave. This amounts to an extra of about 1,100 marks a year.

And now, a few words about pensions. Men are pensionable at the age of 63, and women, at 60. Under any circumstances, a BASF employee, irrespective of his position, is obliged to retire at the age of 65. The pension fund is composed of the employees' own contributions and the concern's subsidies which is in proportion of 2–3. Certain sums are contributed by the state and by minicipal authorities. As a result, a retired BASF worker is, if anything, even better off moneywise than he used to be on the job.

BASF is famous for its wigs, among other things

The first cut-rent homes for the workers were built in 1866. The year 1884 saw the introduction of social insurance, and the year 1888 – of pensions. It was the BASF concern that opened Europe's first sanatorium for its factory and office workers. Its two polyclinics employ nearly 200 doctors and trained nurses who pay much attention to prophylaxis. The BASF runs its own round-the-clock ambulance service, two rest homes and an after-work preventive outpatient clinic.

"What about the vouchers?" I asked.

The Germans did not get my question. "No problems," Gunter Klain replied with a shrug. "These health centres are interested in having as many patients and holidaymakers as they can handle."

If one falls ill, the BASF pays him a full-wage sick benefit irrespective of whether he is a member of the trade union and of how long he has been with the enterprise.

A Mother and Child programme has been worked out for women workers. Expectant mothers who go on maternity leave keep their jobs. Until her child comes of age, a woman may work part-time. "We proceed from the fact," Lothar Hieck says, "that no one can take better care of children than their mother. The more time a woman spends at home, the better for society."

At a factory canteen

Lunch time came. We went down to one of the BASF's 300 canteens. The place turned out to be aseptically clean, efficiently run, – and, of course, free of queues... Lunchers are served set meals – a tray sealed with a cellotape, complete with a knife, a fork and a spoon, all of them dispensible. Sugar, bread and condiments are to be found on every table. My "set meal" consisted of the following: a salad of fresh vegetables, chicken broth, potatoes with meat, coffee and a piece of cake (incidentally, cake is eaten with a fork in Germany). Prices vary from 2.40 to 4.80 marks depending on the set meal you decide upon (three of them are offered to choose from) – much lower than those charged by any other German "public catering establishment." The concern meets part of the meals' cost. Beer and dry wine are extras.

Alcohol in the middle of a working day? My misgivings on that score were dispersed by Roman Bucheler, a representative of the concern's administration. "No-one will overindulge, I assure you," he told me.

He proved right. Just a few employees ordered a round of cold wines in the lounge. None asked for a re-fill.

There are cigarette vending machines in the lounge selling eight brands of German, American, French and English cigarettes, at 4 marks a pack. I wondered why there was no difference in price, but a closer inspection revealed that some packs contained 21 cigarettes, and others, 19. Incidentally, such vending machines are scattered all over the city, and operate round the clock. Curiously, no one tears them apart... But for all that, smoking is on the wane at BASF. It is unfashionable, costly, and, indeed, hazardous to health.

"Create at your leisure time"

Fitness is held in high esteem at the BASF, although I did not see any Keep Fit ads. Instead, a much more powerful weapon is brought into play – the Deutsche mark. The workers who go in for sports are paid extra bonuses. But this is just one side of the medal. The other one is the bosses' personal example. Before clocking in, the rank-and-file and the bosses of the concern jog along park alley in what looks like a well-knit family.

Many BASF workers cycle their way to work along special green paths. The saddles are padded with cellophane – hygienic and water-resistant... Incidentally, you will hardly see a car with just one driver at the wheel. A neighbour drives his neighbour to work, and picks up a friend along. Tomorrow it is going to be the other way round. Indeed, why drive around alone?

As distinct from competitors, from other chemical concerns (Hoechst, Bayer whose professional football team, Bayer of Leverkusen – has caused so much trouble to Soviet football fans) preference is given to amateur sport. The sports grounds in Ludwigshafen are just fine. The gymnastics, weightlifting, badminton and other clubs are free and open to all. Exotic pastimes like taekwondo and squash are also cultivated... BASF championships among amateur athletes are conducted. Children, invalids and pensioners are not neglected, either.

"Create in your leisure time" is the motto of BASF's numerous hobby clubs.

The concern is not averse to charity. A Marc Chagall exhibition was held in Ludwigshafen in 1990. Arranged in time for it was the exhibition of books on his life and work entitles "My Life, My Dream." Such exhibitions are by no means rarities at the BASF. Classical music concerts are given at the theatre. The best Western rock groups perform at the factory's concert hall. Tickets to any concerts are sold to the BASF workers at a considerable discount. Last but not least, for those who like to read there is a library of 250,00 volumes.

"We do not think that the money put into welfare projects is lost," says Dr. Cantzler.

The BASF emblem can be seen not only on the ad posters. It is to be seen everywhere: in canteens, factory shops, on overalls. The 'aniliners' are proud of their belonging to the chemical giant on the Rhine. How could it be otherwise – after all, this is an Unsere Fabrik.

Yakov Borovoi

LUDWIGSHAFEN – MOSCOW

HUMAN RIGHTS

Dodging the draft

Thousands of young men dodge the draft or desert from the army every year. According to the law, they are criminals

Alexander Kopitsyn is not a convinced pacifist or member of a religious sect opposed to bearing arms. Simply, he is afraid of serving in the army, which means being bullied by soldiers who have served more and being victimized in clashes between different ethnic communities existing in each unit. When summoned to the local recruitment office, Alexander Kopitsyn signed a formal refusal to serve and firmly told the investigating officer that he would not join the army.

Kopitsyn did a three-year course in a technical college and for some time worked as a fitter's apprentice. Today he is in Moscow's Butyrka prison: he was arrested early in the morning, and taken into custody right from his bed. This country's law-enforcing bodies complain that there is not enough prison room for even repeaters, but there is always a spare cell for people like Alexandr.

Those who are afraid of being bullied in the army run the risk of winding up in prison

Many young Soviets are dodging the draft. The Ministry of Defence expects the Procuracy to investigate each case and wants the dodgers to be severely punished. So far the Procuracy, which is well informed about all cases of draft-dodging (conscientious objection or simply fear) and occupied with fighting real crime, has been reluctant

to display the expected reaction. It is possible, though, that after it deployed troops in some republics to seek out the dodgers, the Defence Ministry may be tempted to demand harsher punishment. Will it influence the work of the courts?

The trial of Aleksander Kopitsyn took place on March 23, this year, but the case was returned for additional investigation. The Criminal Code was grossly violated: Kopitsyn was not allowed to consult with a lawyer immediately after the end of the preliminary investigation.

The additional investigation may take a month or so. However, the lawyer's request that Kopytsin be released on parole pending the trial has already been turned down. Aleksandr Kopitsyn is going to be in prison all the time the additional investigation lasts. Judge Ivanov refused to comment on the court decision.

Alexander Kopitsyn: almost two months in Butyrka

"The law allows keeping a person in custody in order to prevent that person from committing more crimes," says Aleksander Kopitsyn's mother, "But my son is neither a murderer nor rapist. Is he any dangerous for society?" Why do they continue to keep him behind bars?"

Where is the way out? Sergey Sorokin, a volunteer defender of Kopitsyn, member of the presidium of the All-Union Committee of Parents of Servicemen, sees the only way out in the abolition of Article 80 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Republic that stipulates criminal punishement for draft-dodgers.

"Mandatory conscription and the absence of the right to refuse to do army service are violations of Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which says that no one can be kept in slavery," Sorokin says. "We need a professional army that will considerably raise the material well-being of the servicemen. The Human Rifhts Committee of the russian parliament must speak up for the abolition of Article 80. It is ironic that a republican parliament should protect the interests of the union army.

"The parliament of the Russian Republic," Sorokin went on to say, "often conflicts with the Kremlin on really disputable issues. And on this issue, which is exactly in its competence, the parliament has been slow to act. I cannot understand this."

It is extremely difficult to get any information about the problem, Sorokin complained. So far trials of draft-dodgers have been ignored by the media. Only one trial – that of pacifist Oleg Gorshenin, member of the public group Doveriye – received a wide media coverage. Gorshenin was released thanks to the pressing demands from the public, in particular Amnesty International.

However, the public cannot be involved in each such case. Kopitsyn's lawyer belives the case of his client is a standard one.

Some 2151 young men refused to serve in the army in the spring of 1990 and about 3000 – in the autumn of the same year in Moscow alone. The respective numbers of those fined or subjected to other administrative measures are 828 and 579. 504 and 309 young men resorted to self-multilation or simulated illnesses, in order not to be drafted. In the spring of 1990 district recruitment offices of Moscow sent 786 cases for Procuracy investigation and 271 cases in the autumn of the same year. 11 people were convicted. Cited below are different statistics that may help explain the above-quoted figures.

37 Muscovites were killed (died) while on the army service in 1989, 4 in 1989 and 35 in 1990.

According to the findings of an ad hoq USSR Supreme Soviet committee set up by the President's decree, 6 to 8 thousand people die every year while on the army service. About 80 percent of the victims died as a result of being bullied by "deds," soldiers who have served more than a half of their term.

Valery Abramkin, head of the Public Centre for a More Humane Penitentiary System, has supplied the following statistics:

At least 200,000 grave crimes against the individual are committed in the armed forces. Besides murders, the number also includes the instances of rape and severe bodily damages causing lasting disorders. These crimes, Abramkin insists, are not registered anywhere, are not investigated or investigated inadequately.

* * *

Will Article 80 be abolished? Is mandatory conscription a violation of international law? What is the parliament of Russia going to do about this?

Answers People's Deputy of the Russian Republic **Sergey KOVALYOV,** Chairman of the parliamentary Human Rights Committee.

"As long as the Law on the Universal Military Duty remains in force, the abolition of Article 80 will be a legal nonsense. If there is a law, there must be another law stipulating sanctions for the violations. In this respect the courts' sentences to offenders charged under Article 80 are completely and perfectly legal. I do not understand, though, why the court refused to re-

Convicted under article 80...

The following men are mentioned in the list of political prisoners in the USSR published in Munich by Kronid Lyubarsky.

Alexander Alexandrin – deserted from the army on political grounds.
Nikolai Borisenko – a Jehovah's witness, refused to serve on religious grounds.
Eduard Bugrov – deserted from an army unit after being beaten and humiliated by fellow servicemen.
Tavo Vaynaste – deserted from the army, attempted to cross the border.
Petr Danelyuk – a Jehovah's witness, refused to serve on religious grounds.
Vladimir Dobynda – a Jehovah's witness...
Mikhail Karmanov – a Jehovah's witness...
Vladislav Koropatsky – a Jehovah's witness...
Tauno Kotkas – attempted to defect from the USSR while on the army service...
Ivan Ryaposov – a Jehovah's witness, refused to serve in the army on religious grounds.

NEW TIMES can add new names to the Lyubarsky list:
Awaiting trial – **Vadim Zverev**, a Moscow college student, the father of a baby boy.
Convicted – **Sergey Osnach**, from the Ukranian town of Shostka who refused to serve in the army "defending the socialist choice." We also have information that objector **Yullar Lyuall** is kept in a punishment batallion somewhere in Estonia.

lease Kopitsyn on parole pending trial. Why is a suspect put behind bars before trial at all? To prevent him or her from escaping justice, committing more crimes or bringing pressure to bear on the investigators or witnesses... Were there any reasons to suspect Kopitsyn of any such intentions? None...

In France, for instance, the refusal to do the alternative service is punishable with several months of suspended sentence. One day gendarmes come for the objector and escort him to the local court where the judge reads out the suspended sentence. After that the objector does not have to do any mandatory service. Actually the punishment is reduced to neighbours' rumours: "Gendarmes have come for Mr. .... son..."

However, the problem is the bad law, not the defective court practice. The ideal solution would be the establishment of a professional, voluntarily manned army. Such an army is always politically aloof, and the service in it is paid for with the account taken of possible risks. A man serves in the professional army in the way a fitter serves at a plant. It is quite possible to make the army professional. Experts agree that the conversion of the army to a professional basis it would. Naturally, no radical reforms will be possible without the preparedness for such reforms. That is why, in this country a professional army is still a matter of the future. But there is also an intermediate solution – to set up alternative service which exists in all civilized nations where mandatory conscription is still practised. This variant carried a number of difficulties, though. Is there any way to define whether person really refuses to serve on the religious, political or other grounds? Only conscientious objectors are entitled for the alternative service.

Alexander Kopitsyn is simply scared by the atmosphere of lawlessness which reigns supreme in the army. This is a different problem. In order to eliminate such fears, the army must be reformed so that crimes and human rights violations there should not be possible. This problem can be solved and must be solved as soon as possible. But this is the problem of the army personnel policy and internal structure. The epidemic of "dedovshchina" (bullying and exploitation of recruits) did not appear without the officers' blessing. Actually, officers opted to follow the example of labour camps bosses, whose practices I know from my own experience. In the labour camps, the bosses use the principles of thieves' hyerarchy and stool pigeons – this allows them to maintain a semblance of order in the camps. The same is in the army: you only have to ignore what the "deds" do to have a semblance of order in your unit: when young soldiers are ruled by the fist, they would obey any order – they would give their ration of butter to the "deds," they would polish the "deds" shoes and they would scrub the lavatories.

This phenomenon can be eliminated – although with great difficulties – even in the context of a non-professional army (however, let me stress once again that a professional army would be the ideal solution). What is needed is cultured, legally-educated and humane officers. As long as such officers are not there, legal sanctions will be needed. We know the way they investigate murder cases in the army. The parents receive a zinc coffin with a notification that their son had committed suicide. And inside the coffin there is a dead body bearing the marks of beatings and torture, cigarette burns... It remains unknown whether the man had really committed suicide to avoid more torture or had been killed. I know some men who were gang-raped in the army, and I am not sure they will ever recover from the shock. But from the viewpoint of the Military Procuracy, everything is OK. The very fact that such crimes are investigated by the Military Procuracy, not the ordinary procuracy, is very suggestive. Why do the instances of beatings, torture and bullying have to be investigated by the Military Procuracy?

All these problems can be solved in the course of a comprehensive army reform. The best option now to make the law better is the alternative service. The parliament of the Russian republic must introduce it, the more so as the Soviet Union pledged to introduce it when it signed the final document of the Copenhagen CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension. Today the absense of the alternative service in this country is a violation of our international committments.

...As long as the alternative service remains a matter of the future, boys known in this country as "persons of the conscription age" will have no choice but to count on the compassion from judges, attention of lawyers and involvement of human rights activists. They have no choice but to hope that the Defence Ministry will not start another inter-republican hunt for draft-dodgers...

What can Alexander Kopitsyn hope for?

Tatiana Chernova

Fighting men or lackeys?

Letter from an army unit addressed to the All-Union Council of Parents of Servicemen

Dear mothers!

Addressing you are the men of a small military construction team. You are our last hope: there is nowhere else we could apply for help. Our patience is running out and we can no longer bear the outrage committed by the officers. We have reconciled ourselves with the hardships of the army life, but we do not want to put up with the actions of the team commander. He and his deputies want to turn us into a bunch of speechless slaves. Every day we have to suffer humiliation and hear abuse levelled at us and our mothers. Besides moral sufferings, each of us has been physically humiliated as well. The officers beat us for any small mistake, or for nothing, using beatings as the only means of "education" as they understand it... We cannot strike back, otherwise we will be in prison.

Our officers are having drinking parties practically every day – at the headquarters, in the messroom or in the bathhouse where soldiers-lackeys have to bring them food, to clean the place after such parties, to carry the drunk officers to their homes in service cars. And one can expect anything from a drunk... Company officers cannot help us – they are as unprotected as enlisted men.

We address you and we do not write to our parents because we fear they will not be able to face the truth about how we serve. We are pleading you for help: Any of us may be driven to commit suicide or to kill the team commander.

Please, don't send this letter to the Procuracy: it will not help, only will make life worse for us. Personal connections are very often stronger than honour and conscience.

Seven signatures

Number fourteen

Tatiana Ivanova

I'd like to ask all Russian Federation presidential candidates where they would rank the Georgian earthquake in the *Vremia* news programme

News of the Georgian earthquake came fourteenth, or perhaps thirteenth in the *Vremia* news programme. Which means there were thirteen, or perhaps twelve, more significant news items. Yet it is eight centuries now that such a disaster overtook Georgia. The ground gobbled up several villages with young and old, secessionists and communists, the right and the wrong, sluggards and the industrious, the beauties and the beasts, babies, cows and cats, superiors and subordinates.

For decades we have been living in one country, even "in one family," as was said. Still Moscow did not hang out flags at half mast, the TV and radio went on laughing and singing, nobody banned the demonstration in the country's Number One square, and at the country's Number One grave there stood, as has long been customary, VIPs saluting the demonstrators. But nobody said: bow your heads, misfortune has struck.

People were killed in two Armenian villages in Azerbaijan. Though people perished, neither on TV screens, nor on the radio did any Soviet leader speak out to say he would immediately sort thing out, indict and punish the persons to blame for the massacres. None said that we would weep together over the dead. None promised that he would do all in his power to have no more killed in this country.

How inhuman our life is, I think. When will it all end? Does our government really have too many of us, not to have any pity for us?

What, going hungry? Work harder. What, being killed? Behave better. What, gobbled up by the ground? So what, not all were gobbled up, and so we shouldn't spoil the overall mood, as, after all, life still goes on.

We have on one sixth of the earth's land mass, the most astounding relations of all between people and government, perhaps the most surprising since civilization began. The people and the government detest one another. Of course, there have been cases when no love was lost and still are. After all there are other feelings besides love, such as reciprocal respect, accord, expediency, common interests, etc. Only apparently not what we have – no respect, no accord, no expediency, no common interests, in short, nothing.

The official newspapers, TV and radio emit the icy blast of space. Which also comes from our top tribunes. Ranking first amidst terms of abuse used in the state is democracy, with populism the runner-up.

A populist, as I understand is a person who speaks to people about what worries them, and being a politician, promises to deal with these things at short order as to obviate the apprehension, pain and perplexity. In short, a populist is a fellow who wants to be popular.

But what do the top authorities in the USSR want? I really don't know. But I'll never vote for people who crave Heaven knows what, save popularity. Let Heaven knows who vote for such folk.

So watch your television, in whose *Vremia* programme the Georgian earthquake was number fourteen, yourselves.

I'd like to ask all Russian Federation presidential candidates what place they would accord the Georgian earthquake in the *Vremia* news programme. And I'd also like to ask them what they would put first.

Professor Sergeyev – and if you still don't know who he is, let me tell you he is a celebrated political economist and theoretician in the domain of developed socialism, who is one of the claimants to the Russian "throne" – would no doubt tell me that what must come first is news about the planting and sowing and how to fortify labour discipline at factories and building sites.

Nikolai Ryzhkov would probably say nothing could be more important than the productivity of labour and vertical links. He'd probably add that in this country, where ideology comes before economics, the principal thing is to reveal the beginnings of the regulated market within the context of prosperous socialism. Hence he'd put priority on ideology, socialism and regulated beginnings.

Or take Vadim Bakatin, who, they say, may run for the presidency. I have not the slightest idea what he'd put first and what last. What generally do I know about him? It seems he was extremely embarrassed when he had to publicly "sling mud" at Yeltzin. It seems he had plans of coming to terms with the republics in a more or less human fashion as regards their relationships and those of the central authority with the police. For some reason he is greatly detested by the Soyuz faction of deputies, evidently for that past embarrassment and the unattempted plan.

However, as regards those I don't know, I have no intentions of putting them to the test. How can one vote for somebody one doesn't know? Just because he has a nice smile? Or perhaps because the Communist Party recommends him?

How, in principle, can one vote for a politician, advanced in years at that, who has never sought popularity, which, evidently, means he sought something altogether different? No, my good people, let's put our heads together and think hard, as after all, we'll soon have to vote again and again.

As regards the most likely Russian Federation President I personally think everything quite plain. Yeltsin seeks popularity and cherishes popularity, which means he wants us to like him and will conduct himself so as to get us like him still more. As regards Yeltzin, you cannot deny him the human pain he feels over the number fourteen news. With him it would never range fourteenth. But as concerns the others, the central authorities, we citizens, must make sure we don't err, that we don't cast our votes for folk who find principles, ideals, structures and ideology more important, for folk for whom our lives, yours and mine, come fourteenth.

What did Stalin say on May 5, 1941?

Lev Bezymensky

What Joseph Stalin said in his last public pre-war address has been unknown for the last fifty years. Today it is time to reveal the mystery

Shortly before the beginning of World War II Adolf Hitler told his generals:

"I will give you a propaganda pretext to start the war. I do not care whether that pretext will be convincing. Nobody asks the winner whether he has told the truth..."

In 1941, Hitler again put this rule into action. His addresses to the German nation and the armed forces of Germany were dominated by one argument: the Soviet Union had been a threat to Germany and Germany had to defend itself. Hitler insisted that since 1940 the Soviet Union had amassed so formidable a force on the German border that "it could have not been interpreted differently than a direct threat." Naturally, the Führer could not have overlooked that threat, "otherwise it would have been more than an error, it would have been a grave crime against the German nation and all Europe." Hitler's words echoed in the note Ribbentrop handed in to Vyacheslav Molotov at 5.30 a.m., June 22, 1944: "The Soviet government has broken and violated the treaties and agreements with Germany."

Fully in accordance with that version, on that same day of June 22 Joseph Goebbels secretly briefed the German media instructing them to actively develop the thesis about "the Bolsheviks' criminal double play which has necessitated massive action by a millions-strong army from Nordkap to the Black Sea."

June 22, 1941. Ribbentrop declares war against the USSR

However, as they tried to convince the world that on the part of Germany the war against the Soviet Union was one of preventive character, the German propagandists met with some serious problems. First, they did not have any facts to back up their version. Second, the advance of the German troops deeper into the USSR was so rapid that one could not help wondering why the Soviet Union was suffering defeat after defeat if it had been getting ready for the war since 1940?

Stalin as a witness?

It is easy to understand that the argument about "preventive war" soon lost its significance for Berlin. But after some time that argument surfaced again. In 1942, a new source was unexpectedly found – Stalin himself!

German intelligence officers reported to Berlin that some of the captured Soviet officers had been present at the May 5, 1941, Kremlin reception for graduates of military academies. Joseph Stalin addressed the graduates and spoke of the necessity to launch an offensive so as to expand "the socialist front." The most detailed account of the Soviet officers' testimony was presented after the war by Gustav Hilger, former Councellor of the German Embassy in Moscow. He personally interrogated three Soviet POWs who gave the following version of Stalin's address:

"The Red Army must finally get used to the idea that we have entered an era when the socialist front has to be forcefully expanded. Those who refuse to see the necessity of the offensive attitude are petty bourgeois and idiots."

On October 19, 1943, the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, met with Prof. Filov, member of Bulgarian Regency Council, and told him in particular that speaking before the military academy graduates Joseph Stalin had, allegedly, unambiguously declared that the Soviet Union would invade Germany in August 1941.

...Both Ribbentrop and Hilger are long dead. However, references to Stalin's mysterious speech continue to appear in newspapers, magazines and historical surveys. Moreover, today there are more advocates of the thesis first declared in Berlin on June 22, 1941. If in the first postwar years this thesis was advocated only by the Nazi has-beens, in the past few years it has found supporters from among many historians, especially German ones. It must be noted for the sake of justice that speculations on that theme have also been observed in Soviet media.



Joseph Stalin (a prewar-time photo)

The mysterious speech

Historical mysteries appear in different ways. Sometimes they are born due to a chance coincidence, sometimes they are produced on purpose. The mystery of Stalin's speech belongs to the latter class, of which there are several confirmations.

The press report about Stalin's address on the day after it was delivered was very laconic and, naturally, foreign diplomats and journalists went to exceptional lengths to find out what was actually said by the General Secretary of the Bolshevik Party who became Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars the next day after the speech in the Kremlin. The German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg, first sent to Berlin the official Soviet report and on June 4 added the confidential information obtained by Schüle, the Moscow correspondent of Deutsche Nachrichten Büro, from an unidentified source. That information said that most participants in the Kremlin reception developed an impression that Stalin's chief concern was "to prepare his followers for a new compromise with Germany."

Today it is known that the Schüle information was a result of deliberate misinformation launched by the Soviet side in order "to calm down" the German partner. The prominent British journalist, Alexander Werth, who had good connections in Moscow, received somewhat different information. According to him, Stalin said that a German invasion was possible, even "inevitable in 1942", and spoke of his desire to postpone the beginning of a Soviet-German armed conflict until autumn.

Obviously, the content of Stalin's speech was of great interest, and not only for foreign diplomats stationed in Moscow. That was an unprecedented time: even common Soviets realized that something horrible was soon to happen. The world war had been raging for a year and a half already, but so far the USSR had managed to stay aloof from it. But for how long?

At that time Soviet people were not exactly spoiled with too much glasnost and were quite satisfied with brief official reports. Everybody believed Stalin knew better. He really did. An indirect confirmation of this were the numerous attempts to misinform the Germans. However, the speaker himself had something different in mind when he spoke in the Kremlin addressing the cream of the Red Army, on whom he pinned all his hopes and expectations.

All this has long tempted me to try and obtain more reliable information about Stalin's speech. So far, the shorthand records of the speech have not been found. Most probably, such records never existed, as experts in the CPSU archives of that period told me. However, some of the Red Army veterans who attended the May 5 reception are still alive and I managed to contact and speak to some of them. They said Stalin was speaking with no written text before his eyes. All those present had been warned against taking notes. Nonetheless, the military archives preserved a concise, 9-sheet account of Stalin's speech. Taking into account the fact that the whole speech lasted about 40 minutes (this was specified in the official report) and that Stalin was a very slow speaker, the record found in the military archives may easily be almost a verbatim rendition.

The speech consisted of two parts. The first part (a little bit more than four pages) was devoted to the state of affairs in the Red Army. The second part, which is of interest for us, dealt with that time's international situation. It is reproduced in full below.

"Soon you will return to your units from Moscow. Red Army men and commanders will start asking you questions about what is happening now. You have studied in the academies. You were quite close to the high commanders. Tell us what is happening in the world? Why was France defeated? Why is Britain suffering defeats? Why is Germany winning? Is the German army really invincible? A commander must be able to do more than just give orders and commands. A commander must know how to talk to the fighting men. A commander must be able to explain things to them, to talk to them in a friendly manner. Our great military leaders were always close to soldiers. We must act as Suvorov did.

"They will ask you – what are the reasons, why is Europe in turmoil, why is France defeated, why is Germany winning? Why does Germany have a superior army? It is a fact that Germany has a better army, technically and organizationally. How are you going to explain this?

"Lenin once said defeated armies learned lessons better. This idea of Lenin's fully applies to nations. Defeated nations learn lessons better. The German army, defeated in 1918, has done its homework well.

"The Germans have critically re-examined the reasons of their defeat and found ways to optimally organize their army, to train and arm it.

"The military thought has been making a rapid progress in Germany. Latest armaments were

Military parade on Red Square, May 1, 1941

adopted by the German army. The army was also trained in new warfare techniques.

"Generally speaking, there are two aspects of this problem.

"It is not enough to have good hardware and good organization. One must also have more allies.

"It was exactly because defeated armies learn lessons better that Germany has learned from the experience of the past.

"In 1870, the Germans beat the French. Why? Because they fought a one-front war.

"The Germans were defeated in 1916–1917. Why? Because they fought on two fronts at once.

"Why didn't the French learn anything from the experience of 1914–1918?

"Lenin teaches us: parties and states perish if they turn a blind eye to their errors, if they get intoxicated with their successes, if they rest on the laurels, then their successes make them giddy.

"The French got giddy with their successes, with their arrogance. The French missed the right time and lost their allies. The Germans got their allies. The French were resting on the laurels. The military thought made no progress in France. It remained on the 1918 level. There was no concern for or moral support of the army in France. New morality appeared that corrupted the army. The military were looked down on. Commanders started to be viewed as good-for-nothings who had to join the army because they did not have factories, plants, banks or shops to devote their energy. Even girls refused to marry soldiers. It is only in the atmosphere of such contempt that the army apparat could go under the control of the Gamelins and Ironsides*, who did not know a thing about the military profession. A similar attitude to the military was cultivated in Britain too. The Army must enjoy exclusive concern and love of the people and the government – this is the source of the army's great morale and moral strength. The army must be cherished. When the aforesaid morality appears, the army will never be strong and effective in combat. This is exactly what happened in France.

"To prepare well for a war does not mean only to have a modern army. To prepare for a war also means to prepare for it politically.

"What does political preparation for a war mean? To prepare for a war politically means to have enough reliable allies and neutral countries. When it started this war Germany coped with this task successfully. Britain and France did not.

"These are political and military reasons of the French defeat and the German victories.

"Is the German army really invincible?

"No, it is not. There has never been an invincible army in the world. There are best armies, good armies and weak armies. Germany started the war under the slogan of liberation from the yoke of the Versailles Treaty. This slogan was popular, it was supported and sympathized with by all nations insulted by the Versailles Treaty. Now the situation has changed.

"Now the German army is fighting under different slogans. It has changed the slogan of liberation from the Versailles yoke for the slogan of a predatory war.

"The German army will not be successfull fighting under the slogan of a predatory war. This slogan is a dangerous one.

"Napoleon I was supported and sympathized with when he fought under the slogan of liberation from serfdom. He had allies, he had success.

"When Napoleon I started predatory wars, he met with a lot of enemies and eventually was defeated.

"Since the German army is fighting under the slogan of enslaving other peoples and bringing other peoples under the German dominance, this change of slogans will not bring it success.

"From the military point of view, the German army is nothing special: it does not have any special tanks, or combat aircraft, or guns.

"A significant part of the German army is losing its initial enthusiasm.

"Besides, the German army has developed arrogance, conceit, complacency. The military thought is not developing. Combat hardware is inferior not only to Soviet combat hardware: even America is starting to produce better aircraft than Germany.

"How could it happen that Germany is winning?

"1. Germany is winning because its defeated army had done its homework, re-organized and re-examined the old values.

"2. Germany is winning because having won in World War I Britain and France stopped seeking new ways, stopped learning. The French army was dominat on the continent.

"That is why until recently Germany has been successful in this war.

"Today, however, Germany is fighting under expansionist slogans.

"Where the old slogan against Versailles consolidated all those insulted by Versailles, the new German slogan disunites.

"The German army has lost the taste for further perfection of its combat hardware. The Germans are sure that their army is ideal, the best, invincible. This is not so.

"The army must be tirelessly perfected every day.

"Any politician, any statesman who succumbs to arrogance may confront unpleasant surprises, like France confronted a catastrophe.

"Let me congratulate you once again and wish you all success."

Defence Commissar Timoshenko and Chief of Staff Zhukov – Red Army Commanders

No need for comments?

I don't think so. Not only because the content of Stalin's speech destroys the legend about the Soviet leader's call to "attack Germany." It appears that today – half a century later – Stalin's speech lifts the veil time has shrouded the events of the pre-war time in. This speech brings us back to the period my generation will never forget, when there were absolutely different habits, different concepts, different types of social behaviour, different words.

Let the liberals crucify me, but I am not going to start with castigating Stalin. His serious and logical speech is, no doubt, impressive. To say nothing of the impression it must have made on the participants of the Kremlin reception back in 1941. Both parts of the speech (the one on domestic situation and the one on world affairs) suggest Stalin's complete trust in the

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* **Maurice Gamelin** was commander-in-chief of Allied troops in France; **William Edmund Tronside** was commander of Home Defence Forces (1940).

audience. In his speech Stalin mentioned top-secret data any spy would die for: for instance the strength of the Red Army – 300 divisions. It must be noted that the figure mentioned by Stalin was correct (by June 21, 1941, the total strength of the Red Army was 303 divisions).

Let us briefly consider the part of the speech devoted to the Red Army. It contained very optimistic views on the current condition of the Red Army and the adoption of new weapon system. Stalin only noted some drawbacks in the work of military colleges, but he toasted the successes of the tankmen, aviators and artillerymen. He did not even forget to toast the cavalry. In another toast, Stalin said: "The Red Army is a modern army and a modern army is offensive by nature." This, by the way, was perfectly in line with that time's military doctrine which stipulated immediate counter-offensive in response to any aggression.

You have read the speech – will you call its author illogical? Or will you say some of its points are farfetched? Wasn't Stalin right when he predicted the defeat of armies, parties, even states whose leaders become arrogant and refuse to learn the lessons of history? Wasn't Stalin right when he opposed the legend about the German army's being invincible?

Stalin was right. There is one peculiar feature in Stalin's thinking, though. All his warnings and predictions concerned only the enemy, or at best the commanders assembled in the Kremlin hall. He and the government he headed were above any criticism and infallible.

Today, so many years after 1941, we can see a tremendous gap between the right theoretical approaches voiced by Stalin in his May speech and what Stalin and his entourage did in reality contradicting Stalin's own statements. Actually, when he spoke in the Kremlin on May 5, 1941, Joseph Stalin predicted the catastrophe for which the Soviet Union was heading and explained the reasons of that catastrophe.

How the USSR and Germany prepared for the war

May and June of 1941 witnessed a drama of Shakespearian scale and dimension. Two sides played in that drama. One side was highly experienced Soviet professionals – military analysts, intelligence officers, diplomats working in Moscow and abroad. Their task was to provide as much reliable information as possible. The other side was political leaders who made decisions. And those leaders ignored the information supplied to them.

What was actually happening at that time? Today we know the whole truth: the order to amass German troops according to Plan Barbarossa was issued as early as the end of 1940. All in all, 17,000 trains were to carry troops and combat hardware to the east. Those trains came in five waves. By February 1941, 25 German divisions had already arrived. Seven more divisions arrived in March, thirteen in April and thirty in May. The troops unloaded west of the Radom-Warsaw line and marched to the border areas at night. Thus, by May 1941 the bulk of the Barbarossa force had already been deployed near the Soviet border. Only 12 armour and 12 mechanized infantry divisions were yet to be deployed there. Moscow was regularly receiving information about these troop movements from military and political intelligence.

Planning Operation Barbarossa

The deadline for Plan Barbarossa was set long in advance: in his initial directive issued on December 18, 1940, Hitler ordered all preparations completed by May 15, 1941. After Hitler decided to commit troops to the Balcans in order to protect the southern flank, in April 1941 the deadline for Plan Barbarossa was moved to June 22. Soviet agents were regularly informing Moscow about this too.

These commonly known truths about the pre-war time might be unnecessary to repeat, were it not for the attempts to reanimate the "preventive war" version. Mothball arguments are being activated again (like references to Stalin's speech of May 5). Some historians even go as far as to present the by far insufficient defensive measures of the Soviet Command in April-May 1941 as a proof of Stalin's "aggressive intentions" vis-à-vis Germany. Why not add one more bucket of mud to Stalin's image today when so much of what Stalin did has been condemned?

That is why it is appropriate to recall the German assessments of Soviet intentions made in the spring of 1941 by Germany's military and political leadership. Already at the initial stage of the Barbarossa planning, policy makers in Berlin wondered what the Russians' reaction could be. At that time there was the political vision of the USSR as a potentially aggressive country and the Nazi ideologues fully shared that presumption. Nonetheless, the answer of the German military was: "it is highly unlikely that Russians consider themselves fit for a large-scale offensive."

This was the initial opinion. As the Barbarossa deadline drew closer, Hitler voiced concern about the possible preventive measures the Soviet side could take. This happened on March 25, 1941. Approximately at the same time Chief of the German General Staff Halder noted in his diary:

"The question has been raised on how to cover the East in case of preventive measures by the Russians. However, we should not act hastily. I do not believe in a Russian initiative."

On April 11, Halder's opinion was confirmed by the German intelligence department watching "foreign armies in the East" which reported that the Soviet force continued to be defensive in deployment.

On the other hand, the Halder diary is full of notes concerning the completion of the Barbarossa deployment and the German troops' preparedness for offensive. Halder also quoted Hitler as saying: "It will be a war of extermination. Extermination of the Bolshevist commissars and Communist intellectuals... This war will be different from the war in the West. In the East even brutality will seem too soft..."

And still some historians dare to speak about a preventive war, being perfectly aware of the fact that the planning of the German **aggression** was thorough and lengthy.

Did the Zhukov Plan ever exist?

It is not necessary to explain how dramatic the situation was in May-June 1941. There is one more feature to it: although Stalin was stubbornly unwilling to recognize the reality of the German threat, he was forced to somehow react to the insistent suggestions from Defence Commissar Timoshenko and Chief of Staff Zhukov that at least some countermeasures be taken: partial mobilization and pulling troops closer to the border. Those were actually half-measures but they were taken and but

German tanks on the march

for them the catastrophe would have been even more devastating.

A lot of accusations have been levelled at Timoshenko and Zhukov recently. Today, however, we can see that they were not that inactive. This is confirmed by one surprising document which has been preserved in the archives in the form of a manuscript intended for Stalin's eyes. The date of it is May 15 and the main idea is:

"by no means to allow a German initiative, to prevent the enemy from combat deployment and to attack the German army at the moment when it is under deployment and has not yet organized the front and coordination."

The document specified that the priority strategic objective of the Soviet troops was to destroy the German forces under deployment to the south of the Brest-Deblin line and after thirty days of action to approach the area to the north of the line Ostrolenka – the Narew River – Lowiez – Lodz – Kreuzburg – Oppeln – Olomouc. The next strategic objective was to start an offensive from the Katowice area to the north or the north-west and to occupy the territory of former Poland and East Prussia, no less.

A godsend for the advocates of the "preventive war" version? I do not think so. If one takes a closer look at the May 15 document, one will see some really strange things. First, how real could this plan have been if no mobilization was under way in the USSR before May 1941? A partial call-up started only at the end of May and continued into June. Where were the forces necessary for a 200 to 400 km deep offensive?

There is no information about whether this plan, which in some publications has been dubbed Zhukov's Plan, was ever discussed. We know that the plan was never to become a reality. There were no orders or directives concerning it. The previous plans remained in force which were based on the strategic triad: **repel the first strike – complete the deployment – start a decisive counter-offensive.**

Let me voice one personal opinion: I believe that Zhukov's idea was not in making any plan. Rather, it was a **desperate attempt of the Chief of Staff to bring it home to Stalin how serious the situation was and to make Stalin act.** Zhukov tried to convince Stalin many times, but Stalin never listened to him hoping that the war still could be delayed until the autumn of 1941 or even the spring of 1942. In this context Zhukov could suggest a not very realistic but original idea which would attract the leader's attention and make the latter take resolute steps to counter the impending threat. However, such steps were never taken.

As for practical consequences of the May 5 speech, including the thesis about the offensive character of the Red Army, an impression about them can be formed on the basis of what General of the Army Lyashchenko told me. Lyashchenko was in the Kremlin on May 5 and has always been tormented by one question: If Stalin was so outspoken about the inevitability of the war, why didn't he do anything to get the army and the country better prepared for it? Once he put this question to Marshal Timoshenko who already after the war came to Tashkent where Lyashchenko was commander of a military district. Timoshenko told him that in the middle of June 1941 Zhukov and himself managed to find an opportunity to report to the Politburo about the dangerous situation. Zhukov did the actual reporting, which angered Stalin. Timoshenko got some tongue-lashing as well, and when the marshal reminded Stalin of his recent speech, Stalin retorted: "I said that for the people – they must be vigilant. And you must understand that Germany will never fight Russia alone." And he added:

"If you continue to provoke Germans on the border, if you continue to move troops without our consent – well, you have been warned – heads will roll..."

On saying this Stalin left the room banging the door as he did so.

We still do not know everything about the war. There is much work ahead for historians, politicians, writers. Loud protests have been heard recently against the attempts to belittle the great military feat of the Soviet people, attempts to destroy the memories of that war. I am one of the protesters too. But the old practice of embellishment is far more dangerous and treacherous. The truth about the war and the pre-war time is bitter. We are slowly learning it. Better late than never, people say. But perhaps, better earlier than late?

July 1941 – Stalin's son taken prisoner

Introduced by
New Times analyst
Rostislav Zolotaryov

As one leafs through old Russian journals – socio-political, literary, academic – one comes across, now and again, articles which, although devoted to issues of long ago, seem to have lost none of their topical value. This is certainly not a matter of drawing straightforward analogies although what's going on today tempts one to say: "Déjà vue!" Analogies apart, past experience, including that we have gained over the last three-quarters of the century, helps avoid fatal mistakes, dispel illusions, and give up false faith in quick cure-alls.

As the socio-political crisis in the country is getting worse, and the old mechanisms of government are falling apart, a search is now in progress for effective ways to rectify the situation. Great hopes are pinned on strong executive power vested with the right to rule by emergency decrees. This prompted us the idea to find out what Russian lawyers of long ago had had to say on that score.

We turned to the article by Alexander Alexeyev (b.1851) entitled "The Origin of Emergency Legislation and Its Political Meaning" and published in the *Yuridicheskoye Obozreniye* (Legal Review) journal in 1905. The article examined the practice of preserving relic autocratic methods of government and sums up the foreign experience gained by that time. The author arrives at a perfectly definite conclusion: the use of "emergency legislation" by the government is a survival of "one-man arbitrary rule," bears evidence to the immaturity of democracy and constitutionalism and, what's more, impedes their progress. Incidentally, subsequent developments in certain European states presently reaffirmed the danger of such "emergency measures." A state machinery which heavily relies on "the rule by decree" and the executive power's extraordinary rights is in constant danger of degenerating into a machinery for the "reproduction of the state of emergency." A law-governed state (or a state on its way to the rule of the law) ought to extricate itself from emergency situations by constitutional methods which presuppose a clear-cut division of powers, a sharp delimitation of their functions and a strict constitutional responsibility borne by all the office-holders, from top to bottom. In special situations - particularly against the background of political polarization and social instability – "emergency powers" lead to an excessive polarization of the state bodies, and encourage "one-man and Party arbitrary rule."

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

By publishing this article by A.Alexeyev, we bring back into scientific circulation the name of a prominent Russian lawyer who had made a sizeable contribution to the progress of Russian jurisprudence. Unfortunately, his name has sunk into oblivion – most undeservedly so – and we failed to ferret out authentic information on the last days of his life (although, judging by everything, his fate spared him: he hadn't lived to see what he warned against: the onset of dictatorship).

Prepared for publication by Andrei Edemsky

On the state of emergency

Alexander Alexeyev

The modern law-governed state is characterized by recognizing the law as the supreme principle of its activity and organization, as an expression of public self-determination – it precludes one-man arbitrary rule and subordinates all the substantial functions of the political organism to the political rules laid down by public bodies. For all the organizational differences between modern states of the constitutional type, all of them record in their charters the rule whereby not a single law can be put into effect without the participation and consent of the elected representatives of the people.

Although proclaimed in all the modern constitutional states, this principle does not underlie political activity in all of them – far from it.

Even after the establishment of a representative system of government, the rule of the law takes a long time forcing its way through the views and habits inherited from the old regime: the latter lives on for quite a while not only in the habits and techniques of the governing class, but also in many regulations which have survived the absolute rule and in new institutions established to meet the aspirations and demands of the adherents of the old regime.

Ranking prominently among these institutions is that of emergency decree enactment power, i.e. the right of the head of state to take, in certain cases, measures on his own behalf and to prescribe norms which are under the jurisdiction of legislative bodies.

According to authoritative jurists, this institution found its most perfect legislative expression in Paragraph 14 of the Austrian Fundamental Law of December 21, 1867. I shall quote this paragraph here in order to have a firm point of departure in determining what modern constituional legislation means by the emergency decree enactment right: "If a pressing need for measures which, under the Constitution, require the endorsement of the Reichsrat arises at a time when the latter is not in session, such measures can be prescribed, on the whole Ministry's responsibility, by an Imperial decree insofar as they are not aimed at amending the Fundamental Law and do not involve either a prolonged burdening of the treasury, or the alignment of state property."

The emergency decree enactment power thus entitles the monarch to take measures and to promulgate legal acts throughout the legislative shpere provided these acts do not violate the Constitution and do not involve the burdening on the state treasury; a pressing need for such measures, arising when parliament is not in session, is recognized as sufficient grounds for adopting such acts in the form of decrees; it is up to the monarch himself, i.e. the institution empowered to adopt these acts, to decide how pressing the need for them is. In other words, the emergency decree enactment right empowers the monarch not only to take, in the absence of parliament, extraordinary measures in order to avert a danger threatening society but also to adopt long-term legal acts.

The emergency decree enactment right which gives the government such an extensive scope for arbitrary legislation can in no

way be brought into conformity with the basic principles of the constitutional system of government which demand that all the important state acts be acts of public self-determination, i.e. be adopted by a representative legislative assembly. It is small wonder, therefore, that emergency degree enactment practice does not exist in states which steadily adhere to the rule of the law principle, in modern republics, in Britain, the country of classical constitutionalism, in France, and in the countries which have based their representative government systems on the principle of public self-determination from the very start. This practice exists only in a small group of states whose political system is characterized by the predominance of one-man rule and in Russia where the principles of the law-governed state are still in embryo...

The emergency decree enactment practice furnishes one of the most graphic illustrations of how flexible and pliable constitutional texts are, and of them being unable, in themselves, to restrain the conflicting political ambitions. Indeed, the very states where this practice is conditional on all kinds of restrictive reservations (as in Austria, for instance) resort to it arbitrarily, while the states like Baden and Württemberg, which formally put the loosest restrictions on this practice, give practically no cause for being accused of abusing it. The provisions of the Constitution which define the emergency decree enactment right seem to be at variance with reality. These provisions have, in fact, little to do with the actual state of affairs and, consequently, cannot give on a true notion of the legal meaning and of the political significance of the emergency decree enactment practice. If we are to explain and to interpret an emergency decree as a state legal phenomenon, we should not confine ourselves to a dogmatic analysis of constitutional texts; rather, we ought to disclose the motives for adopting it, the conditions and forms of using it, and, first and foremost, to acquaint ourselves with the political atmosphere and the historical situation in which it appeared and took shape...

Ruling the country by emergency decrees is actually a survival of the pre-constitutional system

For as long as there existed, in a renewed Europe, only the states the political organization of which was based on principles proclaimed by the French Revolution, there was no emergency decree enactment institution which was in direct contradiction with those principles. This institution could emerge only in a constitutional state of a special kind based not on the rule of the law but on the sovereignty of the monarch.

The German constitutional monarchy, which took shape at the end of the second decade of the 19th century, was precisely such a state. It was based on a strict adherence to the monarchist principle. In accordance with this principle, the monarch keeps the full powers of government after the fall of the old regime; the representative bodies he has formed are allowed do discharge only some of the state government functions. This does not make a representative body a co-legislator and a co-ruler, but merely introduces a new link in the overall system of institutions subordinated to the monarch and meant expressly to stand on guard of the interests of the people and to protect the rights granted it by the Constitution. As far as their source is concerned, there is no difference between a law and a decree: both are an expression of the monarch's will; the only difference is that the decree is issued by the monarch entirely on his own, while the law is promulgated with the consent of a representative national assembly; this participation of parliament in legislative activity does not change the very essence of the law as the monarch's prescription. Even under a constitutional system of government the monarch remains the supreme judge and protector of the interests of the state, the supreme ruler of its destinies. Therefore, when these interests call for passing urgent legal acts, the monarch is authorized – obliged even – to pass them at the earliest date, to establish them by injunction, i.e. to issue an emergence decree...

The establishment and extensive use of the emergency degree enactment practice in German states was favoured not only by the state principles those states' representative system of government was based upon but also by the conditions of social life under which it emerged, and the correlation of political and social factors which gave it birth.

In the early period of its existence, the representative system of government in southern German states could not gain enough authority to moderate the monarch's power and to restrain arbitrary rule. It had no roots either in society, divided into rival estates, or in the population which consisted of heterogeneous elements – fragments of state formations gone from the historical scene – which had just been brought together into new political bodies. Parliament had no foothold in the public opinion which lacked any organization and which only found a weak expression in the press downtrodden and intimidated by censorship; society had no past constitutional experience and did not orientate itself in the new and unfamiliar conditions; therefore, it proved unable to come up with definite views, with clear-cut and insistent demands.

That helpless parliament and those uncoordinated public forces were opposed by government power, well-organized and leaning on its army, its centralized administration and its disciplined officialdom.

Naturally, such a correlation of forces between the government and representative bodies doomed the latter to a very modest role and made them unable to put up a successful opposition to the monarchi power's efforts to keep its domination under a constitutional system of government...

... The extensive use of the emergency decree enactment right could not but evoke protests form parliament and stir up public discontent. However, these protests and this discontent were too restrained and indecisive in the early years of the German constitutional system to make any impression on the government and to entail any serious practical consequences.

It was only in the thirties (of the 19th century. – **Ed.**) that their character began to change, and their consequences to show... Constitutions put more or less the same restrictions on the monarch's emergency decree enactment right, which boil down to the following.

First, an emergency decree is issued on the responsibility of the whole ministry (the government in this case. – **Ed.**) between legis-

lative sessions only. Second, it cannot amend the constitution and the election law. Third, it is to be submitted to the chambers for approval when they are in session. The practice of using the emergency decree enactment right presently revealed, however, that these restrictive stipulations failed to set any effective legal limits to the arbitrary rule of the government armed with emergency decree enactment powers.

Indeed, throughout the period of the emergency decree enactment right's existence, the most important guarantee supposed to keep this right within constituional limits – the ministerial responsibility – has never been used; the chambers' right to adopt or reject provisory laws promulgated in their absence, also proved fictitious: the chambers were faced with accomplished facts which no protests could make unaccomplished ones, and parliaments had to resign themselves to a silent acceptance of the lists of provisory acts adopted when the chambers were not in session. A study of the legislation and the practice of using the emergency decree enactment right in Germany beginning with the 1830s reveals no progress either in restricting this right or in improving the guarantees which could restrain the goverment's arbitrary use of it... This practice frose in the forms it had taken in the thirties (of the 19th century. – **Ed.**). When a new political era set in Germany, this right found no place for it in the imperial constituion; the latter gave the Reichstag a legislative authority which ruled out competition of the government's one-sided instructions with the legislative acts adopted with parliament taking part.

Even the mere possession of any special powers by the head of state hampers the development of representative institutions

The emergency decree enactment practice found no imitation in any of the states which adopted a constitutional system of government in the last quarter of the last century and in the current century except Austria and Russia. The emergency decree enactment practice is totally alien to the constitutional systems of continental Europe in the first phase of its development. We do not find it either in the theory, or in the practical legislation of that epoch marked by the predomination of the principles proclaimed by the French Revolution.

Having emerged well away from the main line of the development of constitutionalism, the emergency decree enactment practice was renounced by the states when this development had been completed, and remained only in a small group of states where the principles of a law-governed state were not yet fully established and are still overshadowed by tendencies inherited from the old order of things.

This past and this present of the emergency decree enactment practice announce a verdict on it which is difficult to bring into conformity with the theory, predominant in modern literature, which tries to justify this practice from the viewpoint of the constitutional system of government.

The supporters of this theory offer just one argument in favour of their view: "There are moments in the life of a state when extraordinary circumstances call for urgent legislative measures while the parliament without which such measures cannot be adopted has been adjourned. Under such extraordinary circumstances, the executive authorities s h o u l d b e given extraordinary powers appropriate to them and the sphere of parliament's administrative activity s h o u l d b e expanded to include this category of legislative problems."

These arguments suggest the following line of reasoning: the need for legal acts governing normal social relations arises not from extraordinary circumstances which occur all of a sudden and cannot be foreseen at legislative sessions but is caused by social conditions which set in gradually, in a long process, and which can always be responded to by legislative bodies.

Extraordinary circumstances which occur unexpectedly and which cannot be foreseen by these bodies – such as revolts and uprisings, natural calamities such as floods and earthquakes, famine, require not organic legislation intended to stay in effect for a long time but extraordinary provisional measures. The promulgation of these provisional legal acts does not necessarily call for the government to have the right to adjust social relations by emergency decrees; it is quite enough for the government to be authorized to take provisional emergency measures in situations where the state in extreme danger on condition that the taking of these measures be accompanied by the earliest possible convocation of parliament to formalize these measures. Modern means of postal and telegraph communications, as well as railway, water and other means of transport make such an urgent convocation of parliament no problem at all. It takes just a few days now to mobilize an army many thousands strong, so a few hundred MPs can surely be brought together even faster than that.

Even if the emergency convocation of parliament involved serious difficulties, they can be surmounted in any case and, being of technical nature, certainly pale beside negative aspects of the government's power to issue emergency decrees, which is a matter of principle. The practice of adopting emergency decrees has never played in the states where it is common the role ascribed to it by the theory intended to justify it, i.e. the role of a corrective element of the representative system which imparts efficiency and elasticity to the legislative process; on the contrary, it has always been an encroachment on the constitution, a means whereby the goverment could act without parliament's knowledge and often contrary to its will.

From the constitutional standpoint, the practice of adopting emergency decrees runs counter to the basic principles of the rule of the law; from the political standpoint, it is not a corrective element of the representative system but a convenient means used by the government to act as it thinks fit in the sphere of legislation, even under the constitutional system; from the historical standpoint, it is neither an inevitable stage in the development of constitutional institutions, nor an organic extension of the latter, but a transient episode in the political life of a small group of states, an episode which will recede into the past along with a number of other phenomena analogous to it which are belated echoes of the past order of things.

Anna-Elisabeth Rosmus made her choice in life when she was in high school. When her composition was found the best at a contest in her native Bavarian city of Passau, she decided to write the next composition about the role of her city in the Third Reich. And quite unexpectedly she met with stubborn resistance on the part of the city authorities, who prior to that decision exalted the young writer's talent. The "city fathers" did their best to preserve Passau's reputation of a quiet and old German town which rejected Nazism even during World War II.

The authorities forbade the school girl to use the city library archives which could shed light on the attitude to Jews during Nazism. But pretty soon they regretted it. In order to receive access to the archives Anna-Elisabeth appealed to court and four years later won the case. Apart from this, during that time she found out that the brother of the editor-in-chief of a local newspaper sympathized with Nazies during the war, and that explains why 40 years after the war her materials were not published. Once in a restaurant in Munich Anna-Elisabeth was recognized by neo-Nazies who beat her brutely. Some other time they sent her a bomb by mail.

Anna-Elisabeth's story inspired Michael Verhoeven to shoot a movie he called *The Nasty Girl*. And the story of Passau became known throughout Germany.

Inspite of all this, "the nasty girl" did not leave her city. She is now working on her PHD thesis and is writing the second book about the fate of Jews in Passau before the age of concentration camps. "We failed to prevent Nazism, and we may fail to prevent the next war," says the 30-year-old Anna-Elisabeth Rosmus. "But what we can do is make people feel compassion for others..."

* * *

By the time **Dmitry Bertman** turned 23 he had graduated the State Institute of Theatrical Art (GITIS) in Moscow, staged 12 plays in six of the country's theatres, prepared two concert programmes, entered the post-graduate courses, started teaching at the same college and worked on probation at one of theatres in Salzburg and at Mozarteum. Today the owner of such a rich artistic biography heads the Moscow Opera Theatre "Gelikon".

Dmitry has been interested in musical theatre since his childhood. His favorite toy was a mock-up stage with changing decorations he made himself. At 16 he entered the department of musical theatre directors at GITIS – it was almost a miracle because he did not have the necessary musical education received at the conservatory of musical college. At 19 he staged his first opera – *Iolanthe* at the Youth Musical Theatre which does not exist any more. It was the only time he turned to the super-popular classical repertory.

Bertman prefers to stage works which had never been staged in this country, or those which in his words "are worth sweating at", for instance, Prokofiev's "Maddalena". Dmitry is not afraid to invite other theatre directors to his theatre, since he believes that actors only stand to gain from working with them. So far he is not ready to formulate his artistic creed. "I'm not yet a master," he says. "I'm still studying and my attitude to life is changing all the time. The opera I staged last year would have looked entirely different if I had staged it today. One thing remains unchanged, though, – whatever I do must be interesting."

* * *

Dr. **Sari Nusseibeh**, a leading member of the Palestine movement in the Israeli occupied territories, has been administratively detained. He is accused of spying for Iraq.

Nusseibeh denies these accusations. He claims that he was de-

A follower of St.Nicholas

Natalya Vysotskaya, a member of the Moscow Bar, believes she should not confine herself to providing defence to her clients before and during trial but should continue to defend them after they are convicted. Vysotskaya has organized a Russian Charity Fund to defend the victims of legal errors and grant assistance to indigent convicts in the name of St. Nicholas. In Russia, St. Nicholas is considered to be the Patron Saint of unjustly convicted people.

"Our society is embittered," Natalya says. "And there was a time when our people were known for their compassion. In all centuries people have been urged to be compassionate, because a person who has done wrong will be punished by the Lord anyway. And now we hate such people. And we forget completely that there can be legal errors and that innocent people can find themselves behind bars. After all, the 1930s were not the only time when courts passed unjust sentences."

From her own law practice Natalya learnt that the state has no idea of the number of unjustly convicted people. There is simply no such data. Vysotskaya is working to change the legislative system so as to reduce the number of legal errors.

The Fund will be concerned with yet another problem. In the USSR people have the right to free and guaranteed defence only before and during trial. As soon as the court passes the sentence the prisoner is denied the defence. However, in the US, for example, the lawyer accompanies the prisoner even after the sentence has come into force and until the latter stops protesting against the sentence. Vysotskaya believes that the USSR also needs to have defence for prisoners.

The Fund's address is: Bank account N 2700707 at the Tushino commercial bank "Transfiguration" MFO 201586; Svoboda Str. 30, Moscow 123364.

The bank will soon have its foreign currency account – Natalya Vysotskaya's initiative was supported by the American Association of Christian Lawyers.

tained because of his stand on the Palestinian problem. He believes that this problem can be solved only if Israel recognizes the rights of the Palestinian people.

Human-rights organizations, among them Amnesty International, have called for his immediate release. They believe that Dr. Nusseibeh is a prisoner of conscience, detained for his political opinions which are non-violent in substance.

Some 14,000 other Palestinians have been administratively detained since December 1987. Those currently held include three other prominent Palestinians known for their public support for peaceful dialogue with Israel.

* * *

The Italian porn-star **Ilona Staller**, who last fall offered to sleep with Saddam Hussein in return for the freedom of all Western hostages, continues her career of a politician and a porn-star. As a member of Italian parliament Ilona has been gaining more and more support, and as a pornographic actress she still performs at least 25 of her live strip-shows each month.

Staller has been posing for photographers without a thread of clothing since she was a 13-year-old in Budapest. Her parents hoped she would become a doctor, but in her mid 20s she moved to Rome where she soon became one of Italy's premier porn-stars.

Her election from a Radical Party ballot was unexpected even for many members of the party. It is no doubt the reaction of a cynical electorate which has seen 49 governments since World War II.

As a member of Parliament, Ilona has introduced several novelties: she has proposed that brothels be replaced with cozy houses where people can go to make love; that "love parks" be set up for teenagers and conjugal visits be introduced for prisoners. She also supports a number of Green Party initiatives. In 1989, she visited Hungary to celebrate the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Recently, Staller has become engaged to American pop artist Jeff Koons, who claims to have first seen her in a porn magazine while examining skin colours for one of his sculptures. The two are working on a film entitled "Jeff and Ilona: Made in Heaven".

* * *



Philip Sokoloff, a 68-year-old founder of the American National Association for the Prevention of Heart Diseases, has won a major victory of his life. Following several years of struggle the McDonald's Company will soon launch the production of a new type of Hamburgers which contains only 9 percent of cholesterol. This is two times less than Big Mac and French fries.

The idea to make his fellow countrymen healthier, came to Philip after he had a heart attack and the doctors suggested that he give up food rich in fats. In 1984, a federal research confirmed that an abundance of fats affects the heart. Philip decided to act. The first major step of his Association which still has only three employees, was to conduct an independent testing of 200 thousand Americans in 16 American cities for surplus cholesterol. In 1988, Sokoloff insisted that the US Congress allowed to hold a monthly action under the motto "Learn your cholesterol rate!" Now he is waging a war against the largest food companies, often appears in the press and sends thousands of letters to industrial magnates. The reaction of McDonald's is the first official recognition of the problem by businessmen.

■

"Doctor Chernobyl"

Robert Gale is back in the USSR. This time he has come for the premiere of the Soviet–American film *Chernobyl: The Final Warning*, and the presentation of his book. The returns from its sale will be donated to the Chernobyl Relief Fund.

Dr. Gale was one of the first foreigners to arrive in the Ukraine after the disaster. And already in June he took his wife and two children on a helicopter flight over Chernobyl, in order to appease residents of Kiev who were evacuating their families from the city.

"We don't know all the consequences of the Chernobyl accident," Robert Gale says. "Perhaps, we will never learn them. Then we dealt with only 6,000 people, but from 2,000 to 20,000 can die of cancer in the near future. Chernobyl is the symbol of problems facing the Soviet Union. We need a very detailed, scientific and expensive analysis.

Gale urged the Soviet Union to conduct such an anlysis, but due to a shortage of money his initiative received no support.

The movie about Chernobyl was made with the participation of Ted Turner. It was shot at the new block of the Kursk nuclear power plant which is under construction. The plant itself is an exact copy of the Chernobyl power plant. The Soviet and American cinematographers were assisted by people from Chernobyl. Since the film is based on Dr. Gale's documentary book and his reminiscences, the doctor himself is one of the film's main characters. His part is played by a popular actor Jon Voight, who does not resemble Dr. Gale at all. However, Robert is not confused by that. He believes that it's only better for the audience if the actor is not a dark-haired midjet like the prototype, but a 2-metre-tall blond.

"Secret" Kasparov-Karpov accord?

The story of a rumour

The fifth Kasparov-Karpov match is now history. The world champion retained his title scoring 12.5:11.5 points. No doubt chess fans will well remember it because of the excellent games and intensity.

Yet there also accompanied it the unprecedented rumour of a "secret accord," with Kasparov and Karpov having presumably agreed in advance to arrange a 12:12 point draw, thus, supposedly, allowing Kasparov to easily retain his title and Karpov to receive a "consolation" prize of some $300.000 more than if he were to lose. A case of eating one's cake and having it, as if to imply that today's champions were actually punks.

Were there any grounds for such assertions?

Take the 19th game played in Lyons on December 12 last. The score already stood at 9.5-8.5 points in Kasparov's favour. Playing black, he had a beautiful advantage, but one move before postponement suddenly offered his opponent a draw.

Alexander Roshal, the Soviet correspondent covering the match:

"During the 'brief interlude' between the two halves of the match, I evasively replied that the two rivals would never agree to anything. But then it was only still worse for them, since hardly any other veracious explanation could be found. The present champion runs a much greater risk, which is possibly why he is so jittery and ready to do anything to retain the title...

"The row was terrific. 'A grand scandal. When did black act so rashly, when offering a draw or when bringing his game to so noticeable an advantage? Therein is the rub. Embarrassed, the organizers hoped this sorry story would be refuted after the next games. On the other hand, many of my colleagues think everything is plain. Bets on a 12:12 point score are accepted against all other possibilities... But for the time being I will nevertheless refrain from drawing any final conclusion."

Novoye russkoye slovo (The New Russian Word), December 14, 1990

Food for thought: Alexander Roshal is the first deputy editor-in-chief of the USSR State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports journal" 64 Shakhmatnoye Obozreniye (Chess Review)," whose editor-in-chief, incidentally, is Anatoly Karpov. He is also a member of the editorial board of the Chess encyclopaedia whose editor-in-chief, incidentally, is Anatoly Karpov. One entry in it says (as presented by Roshal, but signed by Karpov), that "Alexander Roshal is one of the most outstanding underivative chess journalists of our time." He was sent to the match by the USSR State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports.

Lev Alburt, Grandmaster and US Chess Champion:

"The rumours of a supposed 'accord' are bruited about by the Soviet side. The more it grows clear to the "Soviets" that Kasparov will retain the title, the more insistently they spread rumours. The purpose is absolutely plain. It is to discredit Kasparov because the champion is one of the most effective critics in the West of the Gorbachev regime. How to neutralize Kasparov? He has to be made to talk about chess. But how? By the simple ruse of circulating the rumour that he supposedly agreed on the outcome with Karpov and so on. Then the central issue would not be the champion's attitude to the Gorbachev regime, but this sham accord.

"For seventy odd years now, the Communists mastered the art of misinformation and are now striving to discredit the world champion. I will not be surprised if this social commitment is discharged by a person high in Soviet journalism... The only scandal here, from my point of view, is that this concoction was printed in an anti-Communist paper."

"However the correspondent is refering to the chess players themselves.

"I would have you know that chess players adore paradoxes, and someone may have facetiously remarked: 'Don't you think they've come to an agreement?"

Novoye russkoye slovo, December 17, 1990.

Victor Vasiliev, a writer on chess!

"How should one treat the hypothesis which the journalist Roshal airs in the American newspaper Novoye russkoye slovo? After the world champion, with a secure advantage in the 19th game and a winning score, dared to offer a draw, Roshal unambiguously intimated without batting an eyelid that the two irreconcilable rivals 'agreed' to end the match in a draw thereby to divvy up the prize. Surely a new Russian word in chess journalism!

"Roshal's sorry story... climaxed the long-lasting campaign... the former presse attaché of the former world champion had been so painstakingly and perseveringly conducting."

Nezavisimaya Gazeta (The Independent Newspaper) December 28, 1990

Dmitry Plisetsky, deputy editor-in-chief of the journal

Shakhmaty v SSSR (Chess in the USSR):

"Who is actually circulating these rumours that amount to nothing but kitchen gossip?



Drawing ty Igor Shein

After all, as US Champion grandmaster L.Alburt, for instance, sees it, 'no serious chessplayer would ever dare to think of such nonsense. However, A.Roshal, the Soviet correspondent at the match, evidently thinks otherwise. This very prolific journalist who in Izvestia and Sovetsky Sport limites himself to no more than hints gives full rein to his imagination in the New York newspaper Novoye russkoye slovo.

Moskovsky komsolets, December 30, 1990.

A.Roshal:

Let me say in advance that I will not refute these rumours. I can refute talk about a Karpov-Kasparov accord only when I have the facts, in hand, which I don't have. On the other hand, neither can I subscribe to this rumour as again I do not have any facts to show that they really had such a thing going between them."

—

*"It's they (some grandmasters.-***Ed***) who subscribed to this story, not Roshal... Upon arriving in Moscow I learned that my colleagues had suggested that I had invented it!"*

—

"... If the counterattack waged against me in the media by some of my colleagues continues, they will have to deal with world ex-champions!"

—

*"You should have heard what Spassky shouted when Kasparov offered a draw! (In the 19th game.—***Ed.***) What he actually said was: 'Bolshevist shit! They've both come here to us in the West to arrange a deal between themselves. It's a complot!' (Let me note that he is as wildly against Kasparov as Korchnoi is for Kasparov)... Later Spassky said to me: "Are you referring to me? Please don't do that..."*

—

"You know what Ljubojevic said to me? 'Even if Kasparov had agreed on a deal with Karpov, chess reviewers should never note it as it would only do chess harm.' A curious theory generally. It is quite likely that chess reviewers should not write about it as they have to prove it, but the media generally may say anything it pleases..."

A voice from the audience:

"But the media generally must also prove it!"

"Very well. Thank you. I said it just to say it, for as you know I have not written anything dirty.

"... All I want to say is that Kasparov and Karpov themselves should refute this story, not look for advocates. How odd for me to take up the cudgels for the two who stay mube?!"

—

"... However, what is it that alerts me? What is it that surprises me? Have you seen at least one major chess interview of Kasparov's after the match ended? Or any of Karpov's? Well, as for Karpov he wasn't there to grant interviews, he immediately left to play in Reggio Emilia.

From a public statement at the USSR Central Chess Club. On January 29, 1991.

Garri Kasparov, world champion:

"Oddly enough, after my defeat in the 17th game I woke up and played a strong game. In the next three games I possessed an overwhelming advantage. Objectively speaking, I should have won all three and thus completed the match at once...

"My win in the 18th game gave me confidence but undermined Karpov's confidence in a successful outcome.

"In the 19th game because of great fatigue, I did not want to finish it even though I had the obvious advantage. My draw offer rescued Karpov from a debacle. Incidentally, in the upshot Karpov undertook an all-out risk in the 20th game, evidently influenced by his psychologists like Akimov, who would say: 'Come on Tolia, he's yours!' But I was not his at all (after this win the score stood at 11:9 points. — Ed).

"... The 23rd game (which Kasparov lost. — Ed.) was a psychological crisis, a letdown after the severest struggle... To be fair, one must say that Karpov put up a very strong fight in that game. Generally speaking, I was rightly punished, anguished by the 24th game, when the score stood at 12:11.

"Is there any need to note the psychological stress that chessplayers feel in the final game, upon which so much depends? Even though I chose a solid beginning, the game was not a calm one. In the middle I made a number of mistakes, which perhaps were not that noticeable, but which gave Karpov serious chances of drawing the match and branding me with the life-long stigma of having played an 'agreed' match. Fortunately, both of us are nervous and Karpov also made more than one mistake and under time pressure went haywire. Possessing a secure advantage I said to him: 'I'm offering you a draw from a very powerful stand!' He accepted my offer and I think that in the given case the tally at the end of the match, whether 13:11 points, or 12.5:11.5 points was of no significance."

"From what you have said one may deduce that in the 24th game you ran the risk of not only losing a goodly portion of the cash prize, and also the French jewellery firm's diamond prize but also of being accused of having plotted with your rival on the end result. Does that mean you also had wind of those nonsensical rumours, which flared up especially so after you draw offer, when you had an advantageous position in the 19th game? How would you explain that?"

"The explanation is very simple. It was most tempting to discredit both chessplayers, especially me, in one go. This reflects the sentiments the chess elite entertain for me."

"What is the reason for that?"

"There's no reason to adore a chessman with an Elo rating of 2.800. For nine years I've not lost a single contest. How can that be tolerated? It's understandable in the case of Bobby Fischer, a chess fanatic, who recognized nothing but chess. I, by the by do a whole heap of things, and at the same time best all top grandmasters.

"No doubt there are other reasons too? Spassky, for instance, says you have split the chess world."

"I am trying to create a world of professional chess, to achieve what chess rightfully deserves. I don't know how speedily and successfully everything will go, but the programme I conceived back in 1985 now stands on the way to accomplishment. This is no easy thing and it encounters resistance from the chess elite. The leading grandmasters have it good as it is, and don't want change. In the Grandmasters' Association my activities go against the grain, as the organization of new tournaments spells the rapid alternation of generations implying that the prospering grandees will be ousted from the main arena by youth much earlier than they would like.

"The chess world has greatly changed in recent years. In 1985 Karpov and I played for a prize of 72.000 rubles. Now the prize stands at 3 million. That again is something I am not loved for. Very much so! In 1972 Botvinnik accused Spassky of having sold out to Fischer for $100.000 (subsequently Botvinnik qualified this as "fiction."— Ed). He simply could not tolerate the idea that for just one defeat, Spassky got more thaan Botvinnik did for all his total of wins. However, history is repeating itself, with Spassky now accusing me of plotting with Karpov!"

From an interview given at the end of the match to the journal *Shakhmaty v SSSR* (and published in issues Nos. 3 and 4 for this year)

Alexander Nikitin, Merited Coach of the USSR

"Kasparov is bright and young. In what he says and does, one will find both contradictions and errors. People who feel for him try to ignore that while people who know him well try to understand the reasons for his delusions and help him, whereas people who dislike him, gloat over what it is not the custom to bring out into the open, try to ferret out a corpus delicti in his mistakes, and failing to find that, invent news sins, which now and again are by no means inoffensive..."

Vechernyaya Kazan (Evening Kazan), December 17, 1990.

Victor Vasiliev:

"It is quite possible that the same opponents will be playing another match against one another in three years' time. The millions of chess fans should get ready to see a chess theatre, in which some will again pelt the actor so superbly performing the main role with rotten tomatoes.

Megapolis Express, February 14,1991

Publication prepared by Candidate Master of Sport S. Skrynnikov

"And Hearst of course is with them"

How the Soviet circus struggled against world imperialism

Alexander Belinsky

The Soviet spectator knows everything! He knows how to split the atom, where the top-secret radar units are, what Radio Free Europe reports every night, and who will be the next husband of a celebrated film star.

However, there was one thing that the Soviet spectator could not discover. This was how Emil Kio effected his astounding wizardry. Where did people disappear to from the boxes, big and small, in the middle of the circus arena? And how does a retinue of midgets appear therefrom?

The Soviet spectator's error is extremely naive. He, the Soviet spectator, thinks that beneath the sawdust of the circus arena is straight way the earth's crust and then the molten plazma and right after it, the earth's core. That is not at all so. Under the sawdust, between all the pipes is a catch through which a person bending down may pass to emerge outside the arena itself. In the middle of the arena there is a floor board which can be removed and therein lies the clue to Kio's "magic."

In 1947 Kio joined the ranks in the relentless struggle that the Soviet circus was carrying on against international imperialism.

The circus fought imperialism openly with no "in-between-the-lines." A spade was called a spade. Thus, if the idea was to expose the flunkey nature of Josef Broz Tito, then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Boris Vyatkin, the clown, glued chunks of sausage to the soles of his boots, donned a tophat, and his pet mongrel, Manyunia, wearing typical a Yugoslav army cap, licked the sausage off. Upon which the emcee commented this highly elegant skit: "Thus the flunkey Tito licks the underboots of Wall Street." The audience, glancing at one another in fright, politely applauded. The spectators must be given their due: the said applause never developed into an ovation. General Charles de Gaulle, hero of the French Resistance movement was dealt with in a still simpler way. Thus Vladimir Durov would lead a camel in a hat out into the arena, and when to the flicking of a whip the camel circled the arena, he would shout in a ringing voice: "Look how pompously M. de Gaulle struts!"

However, there was one politician with whom the Soviet circus evidently had a special private score to settle. There was not a single show, skit or other item, in which he would not be mentioned. He was portrayed by all the bulldogs and boxers in the city, whose lady owners were able to have fur coats made at the expense of the fees they earned from the performances of their pets. This was none other than Winston Churchill himself.

Indeed, it was precisely for his daring, highly esthetic portrayal of Churchill that Kio was rewarded with the title of Merited Artist of the republic. The trick was arranged as follows: to the blare of the brass band a large cage was rolled out into the arena, and shoved into it was Nikolai Skalov who acted the role of an English working man in the garb of a French docker. At the time dockers were very fashionable for some reason, and served to symbolize the revolutionary forces in every capitalist country. Next Grigory Rashkovsky, wearing the cap of the British prime minister, stepped out to hang large locks on the cage. In the meantime torches blazed and the band blared. Audience feeling sympathetic towards the miserable working man were asked to test the strength of the locks. Which, of course, were reliably shut. After this, Rashkovsky-Churchill left the arena rubbing his hands with glee, puffing a cigar and muttering something indecent in English. Behind the curtains he raced as fast as he could, considering his age and figure, to the hatch. A black piece of cloth was let down from the top to cover the cage. That done, Kio fired a pistol, the cloth immediately rose upwards, and inside the cage, Rashkovsky-Churchill raged brandishing his fists, while the smiling Skalov-docker thanked Kio, his liberator who pulled from numerous vases an endless number of white doves. Having been confined to the vases, the doves when released intensively covered the arena with droppings and this all was to symbolize world peace.

The overall finale in the struggle that the circus waged against international imperialism was as follows. The aforementioned Rashkovsky and Skalov recited new anti-imperialist ditties composed by the young versifier Mark Gurevich who, working under the pen name of Yakovlev, struck out at the United States in verses that ended with a list of American politicians presented by means of the following dashing portrayal:

"Everyone who wants to go to war,
Very well knows these names:
Dewey is one, Truman another,
And Hearst of course is with them."

At the time John Hearst was the USA's top newspaper magnate and the line giving his name aroused so stormy an applause, because of its association with a familiar Russian obscenity, that people even hugged one another as if on a great holiday. Meanwhile Rashkovsky and Skalov modestly accepted congratulations and Mark Gurevich Yakovlev was showered with requests. Triumphant, the duo came to Moscow with this skit and present at the first night was none other than Yekaterina Furtseva, then the first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee and subsequently the Minister of Culture. However, the famous line produced a totally different impression upon her, and on the very next day Rashkovsky and Skalov were packed off to Kharkov, thus giving world imperialism a temporary respite.

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

Excerpted from an unpublished manuscript *Theatrical and Circus Legends*

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

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

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